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EXECU TIVE SUMMARY
Context and Objectives of the Study
In Zimbabwe today, the State - through its various agencies - is the dominant player in die mining 
sector, from issuing prospecting licences right up to marketing. The Mines and Minerals Act (chapter 
21: 05) vests authority to administer granting o f prospecting rights, acquisition o f mining claims and 
payments o f levies in the Mining Affairs Board, a body appointed by the Minister o f Mines, 
Environment and Tourism. The Mineral Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe Act o f 1982 resulted in 
the formation o f the Mineral Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe which is the sole marketing and 
selling agent for all minerals exported out o f Zimbabwe, except gold and silver, which fall under the 
control o f the Reserve Bank. The bulk o f mineral revenue accrues to the government ahead o f Rural 
District Councils (RDCs) who have responsibilities towards road maintenance and provision o f other 
services, and local communities who bear the brunt o f environmental damage due to mining activities. 
A study into the structure o f revenue sharing showed that RDCs obtained less than 0.1 % o f the 
revenue (Owen and Maponga, 1996). This revenue is from two main sources. In terms o f section 
96(1 Ob) o f the Rural District Councils Act, Chapter 29: 13, RDCs may charge levies to owners o f 
mining locations situated on rural land in their areas. The levy is based on either the number o f 
employees or output in tonnes in the case o f precious metals. The levy is in the form o f unit tax. 
Section 188 o f the Mines and Minerals Act entitles RDCs to receive landowners' fees from mining 
activities in their areas. This is because, although RDCs are not the legal owners o f the communal land 
under their jurisdiction (the land belongs to the state represented by the president in terms o f section 4 
o f the Communal Land Act, Chapter 20: 04), sub-section (7) o f section 188 specifically provides that 
they are regarded as the landowners for the puipose o f receiving landowners' fees. The fees are pegged 
at $1.50 per hectare for an operational mine and $0.60 for a non-operational one. Mining royalties are 
not collected in Zimbabwe - they were last collected in 1975 as a measure to attract investment in the 
mining sector.
There has been a clamour to redress this scenario. The review o f the Mines and Minerals Act currently 
under way presents a unique opportunity to address these concerns. This is a three-year programme 
that started in August 1998 with the first stakeholder workshop being held on 2-3 June 1999. However 
the direction o f the review, as gleaned from the proceedings, does not augur well for local 
management o f mineral resources. As it is currently conceived the review is about:
□ Reviewing the regulatory, fiscal, policy and institutional framework for mining with the objective 
o f attracting more private sector investment to the mining sector on terms that are o f mutual 
benefit to the investor and to the people o f Zimbabwe.
□ Establishing an internationally competitive climate for private sector investment in mining so that 
mining can make a contribution to employment creation, export earnings and economic growth in 
Zimbabwe.
□ Simplifying the regulatory regime in order to facilitate its enforcement and to streamline the 
administrative procedures.
□ Enhancing the efficient deliveiy o f the technical and promotional services that the Ministry 
provides to the industry.
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An important component o f the regulatory and policy framework for private sector investment in the 
mining sector is the Zimbabwe Mining Titles and Environment Project (ZiMTEP) which seeks to 
address:
a  mining titles and rentals
□ computerisation o f mining titles systems
□ cost recovery on some services provided by the Ministry
□ environmental protection issues.
I f  local management o f minerals is to become a reality there is a need to: a) demonstrate the 
desirability o f local management o f minerals; b) suggest the required modalities to realise this; and c) 
effectively lobby central government. This study, commissioned by the Centre for Applied Social 
Sciences (CASS) at the University o f Zimbabwe (UZ), sought to achieve this through an exploration o f 
opportunities and constraints regarding local management o f mineral resources in Zimbabwe. The 
study sought to provide a base for practical application and material for an advocacy campaign. The 
major question that the study sought to answer was whether the CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) concept, as a means -o f ensuring local 
management o f resources, in which a number o f RDCs have experience, could be applied to mining.
In this study four dimensions along which a review to promote local management could be constructed 
were identified. These were an assessment of:
a  the rationale for bringing mineral resources under local management;
□ whether a suitable policy environment exists;
□ whether an appropriate legal framework does exist; and
□ whether RDCs and local communities have the capacity to implement the desired changes.
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Consequently the objectives o f the study were formulated to:
a) assess the rationale for local management o f mineral resources;
b) assess and evaluate the policy and legal provisions as they relate to the relationship between the 
central government and local authorities as the appropriate authority vis-a-vis administration and 
management o f mineral resources and the benefits accruing from mineral exploitation;
c) collect views o f the main stakeholders on the issues involved;
d) analyse proposals from the stakeholders with respect to policy, financial, administrative, 
management implications; and
e) draw up a set o f recommendations.
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Methodology
A number o f steps were followed in data gathering. First a review o f secondary information was 
undertaken which covered relevant pieces o f legislation such as the Rural District Councils Act, 
Chapter 29: 13; the Mines and Minerals Act, Chapter 21:05; the ZINWA Act, Chapter 20: 25; and the 
Water Act, Chapter 20: 24. The latter two were for comparative purposes. This was complemented by 
tracing recent developments in the mining sector concerning local management o f mineral resources. 
Second, views o f relevant government departments, NGOs, user associations and RDCs (Mudzi, 
Mutoko and Guruve) were solicited (see Box below). Visits to the RDCs were meant to gain some 
insights into CAMPFIRE projects as examples o f local management o f natural resources as well as to 
assess the experiences o f the local councils with respect to mining activities within their areas. Third, 
developments in two key sectors: land and water, were studied with a view to determine whether these 
could be used in the mining sector.
LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED:
Goverement/Quasi Government
Mudzi Rural District Council
Mutoko Rural District Council
Guruve Rural District Council
Minerals Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe
Mining Commissioner's office (Harare District)
Ministry o f Local Government
Ministry o f Lands and Agriculture
Non-Governm ental 
CAMPFIRE Association 
Zimbabwe Trust
User associations
Association o f Rural District Council 
Chambers o f Mines
National Miners Association o f Zimbabwe
The study was also limited by the fact that there is currently under way a review o f The Environment 
Management Bill and the constitution o f Zimbabwe. These may result in some fundamental changes, 
which may affect local management o f mineral resources.
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Findings
The findings o f the study can be divided into the current realities, factors in favour o f and against local
management o f mineral resources.
Current realities
The following points are pertinent:
□ Rights to minerals are vested in the state through the president
a  Tenure does not have any relationship with rights to minerals since there is no surface ownership 
o f mineral rights in Zimbabwe
□ There was limited scope for local community participation as there was not enough responsibility 
vested in RDCs as the appropriate authority (who could in turn delegate it) in the rural areas o f 
Zimbabwe
a  The discussion on local management o f mineral resources cannot be discussed in isolation as this 
touches on the issue o f governance which defines the (power) relationship between the centre (the 
state) and die periphery (local authorities and communities) O f the four types o f decentralisation 
namely, deconcentration, devolution, delegation and privatisation, deconcentration was most 
evident (instead o f devolution) where the state decentralised itself to local offices.
□ Early stages o f the Environment Management Bill were premised on the fact that the Ministry o f 
Mines, Environment and Tourism would have the sole responsibility o f administering the Act. For 
example a draft o f die Bill had repealed those sections dealing with water pollution control in the 
Water Act. The major point here - whether local management o f mining activities will result in 
better management o f the environment - depends on how the Environment Management Bill is 
administered and how local participation is encouraged.
Factors in favour of local management of minerals
The following factors were identified as being in favour o f local management o f mineral resources:
□ It was accepted that it was morally wrong and undemocratic to deny people a chance to participate 
in issues that affected their lives. This was enunciated in government’s most authoritative policy 
document, the ZIMPREST document. There was demonstrable decentralisation in some sectors 
that promoted participation o f local communities’ e.g. in the water and land sectors.
□ A centralised system compromised efficiency and effectiveness o f managing mineral resources as 
the state could not effectively monitor all the mining activities (human and financial resources 
were said to be in short supply)
□ Local people reduced the management costs o f natural resource management
□ Local management engenders local stewardship o f natural resources, which, in the end results in a 
sustainable natural resource management
□ The negligible benefits, less than 0.01%, that accrue to local authorities were neither enough to 
compensate for the losses suffered by local people or to generate interest in natural resource 
conservation.
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□ The enhanced revenue base would result in local authorities being able to. better perform then- 
functions.
□ Prominent NGOs in CAMPFIRE were o f the opinion that local management o f mineral resources 
was the best option since this compensated local communities who bore the cost o f living with the 
resources. Specifically they advocated that:
■ the appropriate authority be given to local communities;
■ (with flie appropriate authority) local communities could negotiate directly with the 
mining concerns; and
■ central government and RDCs should be mere facilitators.
RDCs were agreeable to local management so that they could derive greater benefits. Specifically they:
" wanted a mechanism to be in place to enable them to get more revenue from mining; and 
B did not specifically ask that the mineral rights system needed to be changed.
There has been some movement towards local management o f minerals resources albeit in a limited 
way. The passing o f the Mining (Alluvial Gold) Public Streams Regulations 1991, Statutory 275 of 
1991 allowed some local participation in mining.
Factors against local management of mineral resources
The following factors were identified as being against local management o f mineral resources:
□ The technical capacity o f RDCs was limited thereby making them unable to take over some o f the 
specialised tasks that are currently being undertaken by the Ministry o f Mines. Problems with 
regards to issuing gold permits are a case in point.
□ Individual RDCs can find it expensive to set up administrative structures.
□ RDCs lacked information about mining activities in their district.
□ The Ministry o f Mines was regarded as uncooperative.
□ There was a problematic legal framework in place. Aspects that went against local management 
included:
■ centralised issuing o f prospecting licences to die exclusion o f RDCs and local communities 
B existence ofEPO s which favoured large mining concerns
" annual renewal o f special grants
" restricting RDCs to the collection o f landowners' fees and unit tax
■ RDCs not allowed to share income tax
■ RDCs allegedly being barred from acting as gold traders.
□ Government departments were not receptive to the idea o f local management and emphasised that:
■ existing ownership o f mineral rights would continue i.e. no surface ownership o f mineral 
rights would be permitted. This was said to jeopardise investment in the mining sector and 
was rare in the world as revealed by the study the Ministry had undertaken;
B local management had been shown not to work by the failure o f RDCs to collect the revenues 
they were entitled to and the poor administration o f gold panning permits; and
■ RDCs would continue to land appropriate authority.
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□ There were massive implementation challenges regarding: .
• collation o f information on mining activities so as to come up with a proper mining register
■ enforcing rules and regulations o f various miners e.g. protecting the environment 
" acquisition o f mining output and labour data for purposes o f determining revenue
■ basing with MMCZ and RBZ on marketing o f minerals
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Recommendations
Local management o f mineral resources can only become a reality if  a number o f steps are taken; in 
particular the policy and legal frameworks need attention. Once these are sorted out a suitable 
administrative framework can be instituted. Below are recommendations o f how this can be achieved.
The recommendations are in two parts and o f a general nature in that there is no recommendation on 
individual minerals. First is a presentation o f recommendations for action at the local level. These are 
o f a short-term nature and are mainly concerned with making local communities and RDCs exploit to 
the full opportunities that are present within the existing legislation. The CAMPFIRE Association can 
render assistance. Second to be presented are recommendations that pertain to the national level which 
can only be realised after changes to the legislation, as well as to policy. As such this deals mainly with 
issues o f advocacy.
Action at the Local Level (CAMPFIRE Programme Level)
The evidence that has been presented provides a good basis upon which (CAMPFIRE) project 
interventions can be instituted. It has been shown that lack o f information is the main hindrance. To 
this end capacity building o f RDCs and local communities should centre on providing the information. 
The information required is o f a general and administrative nature.
General
RDCs and local communities need information on:
□ minerals and mining operations within their areas o f jurisdiction
□ labour employed in the mining operations as well as the output which are critical to the 
determination o f unit tax
□ revenue generated from the mining operations in the respective RDCs and how it is shared
□ landowners' entitlements and how the fees are paid and shared
□ environmental impacts o f the mining operations and how they are being corrected
This exercise will result in an inventory o f mining-related activities in different localities, which, in 
time, will form local mining databases.
Administrative
RDCs and local communities also need information on:
□ structure and functioning o f the mining industry in general
□ procedures concerning the determination o f unit tax, how it is actually determined and how it can 
be reviewed
□ procedures concerning application o f special grants to issue gold panning permits
□ representation in the District Advisory Board
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There is also a need to provide information on how the changes proposed or contained in the Land 
policy, Traditional Leaders Act, the Water Act and Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act and the 
Environmental Management Bill will impact on local management o f natural resources.
To this end it is proposed that (mining) district-based workshops be held at which these issues will be 
discussed. Such workshops are advantageous, as they will bring together the local actors. The table 
below contains some suggestions.
Suggestions for proposed mining district-based workshops
TASKS FACILITATORS
Convenors CAMPFIRE Association and CASS
Venues Masvingo, Gwanda, Harare, Bulawayo, 
Kadoma #
Workshop Attendants Chief Executive of RDCs, Chairmen of 
RDCs, CAMPFIRE Project Managers, 
Provincial Administrators, District 
Administrators, Traditional Leaders (only 
chiefs), Ministry of Lands and 
Agriculture, Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism
Opening speeches Provincial Govemor(s)
ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION3
♦ Inventory of mining operations in the 
mining district and various RDCs
4 How to apply for the special grant for the 
purpose of issuing gold permits
♦ Determination and payment o f 
landowners' fees
Mining Commissioner’s office
♦ Composition and functions of the district 
advisory board
<» Relationship between national and local 
environment management
Ministry of Mines, Environment and 
Tourism
New institutions and their role in rural 
development
♦ Determination and payment of unit tax
Ministry of Local Government
♦ Envisaged land management structures and 
their respective roles
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture
♦ Challenges facing RDCs as facilitators of 
development
Provincial administrators
# These are the head offices of the mining districts where Mining Commissioners' offices are located.
3 Some of the items can be assigned to consultants.
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The outputs from such an exercise will be:
□ knowledge and skills acquisition by RDCs and local communities leaders;
□ local minerals and mining databases;
□ mapping out o f "producer communities"; and
□ a position paper for input into the current review o f the Mines and Minerals Act.
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The national level
Local and national levels cannot be completely separated since local issues are affected by national 
policies. The point that flows from this is: since local issues are affected by national policies, whose 
responsibility will it be to spearhead advocacy regarding policy and legal changes to favour local 
management o f mineral resources? It is suggested here that this responsibility be shared between the 
Association o f Rural District Councils, CAMPFIRE Association and CASS. The first organisation 
should take the leading role.
A national workshop, after the proposed (mining) district workshops, is suggested. ARDC will be the 
main convenor with CAMPFIRE Association and CASS playing a supporting role. A number o f 
issues that need to be addressed are presented hereunder. The main output will be a joint position 
paper to be presented to the Ministry o f Mines for possible inclusion in the new Mines and Minerals 
Act.
Refining the policy framework
While an overall government policy o f decentralisation does not oppose local management o f natural 
resources (including minerals) it is not specific enough to promote it. To this end it is recommended 
that the government should be encouraged to be clear on this issue.
For example, with regard to resources, die ZIMPREST document says that, “central government is to 
accelerate the pace o f decentralisation o f responsibility and increase access to resources to the Rural 
District Councils (RDCs)....” (GOZ, 1998: 16) It is not clear whether this includes natural resources. 
Adding the words including access to natural resources may strengthen the case o f local management 
o f mineral resources. This would be in line with developments in the water and land sectors.
/Legal changes
If local management o f minerals is to be realised changes to the present Mines and Minerals Act will 
have to facilitate rather than frustrate it. However, as noted elsewhere in the main report, even under 
the present legislation local management o f mineral resources can be accommodated. Given that the 
government is unlikely to countenance revising mineral rights (i.e. cede them to RDCs or local 
communities) it is suggested that there is no merit in lobbying for:
□ mineral rights to be vested in a body other than the state (which is in conformity with international 
trends)
□ the appropriate authority in communal areas be moved from RDCs, as this goes against 
government’s declared policy.
Thus, local management o f mineral resources can proceed under a ministerial directive just as was 
done when CAMPFIRE was first launched. Once that principle is agreed to, secondary legislation can
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be put in place (in the form o f rules and regulations that lay out how local management o f mineral 
resources is to be undertaken). Areas, which should be addressed by the secondary legislation, include:
° Special grants for minerals other than gold. The decision to issue special grants for minerals other 
than gold could be based on the relative abundance o f the mineral in the locality. This should 
perhaps take into account die nature o f the mineral itself e.g. minerals that are deemed to be o f 
critical national importance can be excluded from the special grant. Interest from local 
communities and RDCs should also be a consideration. In tins regard the suggestion by NAMZ 
that RDCs control gold, chrome and black (as well as white) granite can be used as a good starting 
point/41
□ RDCs, as the appropriate authority in communal areas, should continue to issue the special grants.
□ Special grants should be issued on 5-year rollover basis to avoid cases o f the grant lapsing thereby 
jeopardising the issuing o f permits. This means that after the first 5 years the special grant is 
automatically renewed unless otherwise decided against by the Ministry. This gives RDCs ample 
time to renew the special grant.
□ Landowners' fees should be issued to RDCs, as is the present system with the provision that (part 
of) the money is given to local communities who are affected by the mining activities. The 
prospect o f village certificates defining the boundaries o f different villages makes this easy to 
administer.
□ RDCs should continue to collect unit tax. This tax should primarily be used to repair roads 
damaged by mining activities.
□ EPOs need to be revised to reflect the sentiments o f local management o f mineral resources. 
Institutional arrangem ents
Local management o f mineral resources cannot effectively occur under existing administrative 
arrangements since these make the Ministry o f Mines the only meaningful player. If  the principle o f 
joint-management is accepted whereby both the state, RDCs and local communities play a role, 
administrative arrangements should reflect this. To this end the following need attention:
□ An inclusive representative structure overseeing mining affairs is needed. The five mining districts 
presently designated in the country are a good base for local management. The current District 
Advisory Board should be expanded to take on board players other than die Ministry, CFU, big 
mining concerns and small scale miners that are currently represented. Other players that should be 
included are RDCs - as the delegated land authority in the communal areas, (this can be through 
the Association o f Rural District Councils); communal and resettlement farmers - as another level 
o f "landowners" (this can be through ZFU); and indigenous commercial farmers (through ICFU). 
It is open to debate whether this new look DAB should have the MC, a civil servant, as the 
Chairman. The MC's office would provide secretariat services to the DAB.
□ The Ministry should in some instances have its staff relocated to appropriate locations, especially 
to those areas where there is a lot o f mining activities. This will not only cut unnecessary travel. It 
will also enhance the effectiveness o f monitoring as the officials can easily liase with RDCs and 
local communities. 4
4 Participation of RDCs and local communities should not, however, be confined to those minerals for which RDCs get 
a special grant.
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Revenue sharing
It should be pointed out that the above suggestions will not result in significant gains for RDCs and 
local communities as far as revenue from mining is concerned. To increase the share o f RDCs and 
local communities the following should be advocated for:
□ Fees that are levied in the mining sector should be reviewed upwards as big mining concerns were 
being subsidised by government. The Ministry’s suggestion that it should charge economic rates is 
a step in the right direction. However, it must not be applied across the board as this may 
disadvantage vulnerable groups.
□ Landowners' fees should ideally reflect the opportunity cost o f the land that can no longer be 
cultivated because o f the mining activities. If  this is adopted RDCs and local communities may be 
adequately compensated.
□ Sharing o f income tax as suggested by the ARDC, while it may increase the revenue o f RDCs and 
local communities depends on a new law to be enacted
□ Consideration should be paid to whether royalties should be levied and if  so who receives them 
and how they will be shared. There is, however, a need to maintain a balance between increased 
revenue and investment in the mining sector. If, as suggested above, landowners' fees and the unit 
tax is raised, there is no need to charge royalties.
Hiring out equipment to miners by RDCs as well as participating in joint ventures is not recommended 
since this is likely to be complex and is liable to be mismanaged. As far as possible RDCs should stick 
to their core business o f providing services.
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XIV
1. Introduction
L I  Focus of the study
This study, commissioned by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University o f 
Zimbabwe (UZ), sought to explore opportunities and constraints regarding local management o f 
mineral resources in Zimbabwe (see Appendix I for the foil terms o f reference). Specifically the study 
focused on how local communities and Rural District Councils (RDCs)'5 67' could be directly involved in 
the management o f minerals occurring within their areas o f jurisdiction, so as to derive greater benefits 
therefrom. The negligible benefits currently accruing to RDCs, and practically nothing to local 
communities in the form o f direct benefits, epitomises what is considered to be an unsatisfactory 
relationship between the state, local authorities and local communities in relation to the exploitation o f 
mineral resources and sharing o f benefits.
The first problem lies with the delegation o f authority o f management o f mineral resources. The Mines 
and Minerals Act (chapter 21: 05) vests authority to administer granting o f prospecting rights, 
acquisition o f mining claims and payments o f levies in the Mining Affairs Board (MAB), a body 
appointed by the Minister o f Mines, Environment and Tourism (MMET). The result has been a 
centralised system in the administration and management o f mineral resources. This centralised system 
can be said to be at a tangent to government's declared decentralisation policy as contained in the 
Z1MPREST*61 document, government's most authoritative policy statement (see GOZ, 1998). As can 
be seen from Appendices II and III, which give an overview o f the mining sector in Zimbabwe17' and 
procedures for applying prospecting licences respectively, RDCs and local communities play no 
meaningful role in the management o f mineral resources. The same situation obtains with respect to 
marketing o f minerals (Appendix IV). The Minerals Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe (MMCZ) 
controls all foe marketing o f minerals that are exported out o f Zimbabwe with foe exception o f gold 
and silver which fall under foe Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe (RBZ). The second problem relates to how 
the revenue accruing from minerals is shared. According to foe Rural District Councils Act, No. 8 
(Section 96), local authorities are entitled to collect a unit tax from all mining operations. The unit tax 
is defined differently for precious metals (gold and gemstones) and base metals (coal, coke and all 
such slimes: concentrates, slags, trailing and residues). Units for precious minerals are defined in 
terms o f foe number o f people employed while units for base metals are defined in terms o f the 
saleable output. It is important to note that RDCs are allowed to fix their own level o f unit tax. Local 
authorities are also entitled to landowners’ fees pegged at $1.50 per hectare for an operational mine 
and $0.60 for a non-operational one. Appendix V shows that this situation has resulted in a situation
5 According to the law, RDCs, the successors of district councils in communal and resettlement areas and rural 
councils in the commercial fanning sector, are the appropriate authority (which means that they have the legal 
authority). In turn they can delegate authority to lower structures. In communal and resettlement areas, the question of 
legitimacy has been problematic. After Independence government effectively sidelined traditional leaders. Recently the 
government enacted new legislation, the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, whereby both traditional and elected 
representatives are required to work together.
6 ZIMPEST, representing Zimbabwe's Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, is the second phase of the 
social and economic reforms initiated by the Government of Zimbabwe in 1991. ZIMPREST is intended to provide the 
Zimbabwean economy with a firm basis for sustainable growth, greater employment and equitable distribution of 
incomes.
7 It should be noted that mining in Zimbabwe is dominated by large multinational companies. In the event of 
appropriate authority in the mining sector being given to RDCs and local communities, which is the subject of this 
paper, the issue is: are local communities and local authorities in a position to negotiate with these big mining concerns?
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where a negligible amount o f money accrues to local authorities, less than 1 per cent in many cases.18' 
This situation obtains because, although the Rural District Councils Act (chapter 29: 13) empowers the 
RDCs to manage and exploit natural resources within their areas o f jurisdiction, minerals are excluded.
RDCs where mineral wealth is found feel that the money they get is not commensurate with the 
responsibilities they shoulder vis-a-vis infrastructure development and general service provision. Also 
there is no compensation for the environmental damage that is suffered by local communities. There 
has been a clamour to redress the prevailing situation. The review of the Mines and Minerals Act 
currently under way presents a unique opportunity to address these concerns. Accordingly, CASS, as 
part o f its responsibilities, commissioned this study - to investigate how changes to the Mines and 
Minerals Act could accommodate the desire o f the RDCs, so that the RDCs Act is in harmony with die 
Mines and Minerals Act.
The major question that this study sought to answer was whether the CAMPFIRE P1 concept, as a 
means o f ensuring local management o f resources, in which a number o f RDCs have experience, could 
be applied to mining. CAMPFIRE seeks to place proprietorship o f natural resources (particularly 
wildlife, in Zimbabwe's communal lands) with the local communities that are affected by the use o f 
the resources. It is assumed that through direct benefits these "producer communities" find it worth 
their while to conserve the resources. CAMPFIRE has scored some successes as witnessed by 
decreased poaching o f wildlife. Given that CAMPFIRE has been mostly about wildlife it is important 
to assess its relevance to other resources such as mining. This was the major reason for this study.
This study was intended to support advocacy work regarding changes to the Mines and Mineral Act. 
The idea was to find a basis for lobbying central government to change the existing situation, which is 
seen as disadvantaging RDCs and local communities. It must be said this proposed advocacy is a 
worthwhile exercise judging by the nature o f the review that the Ministry o f Mines, Environment and 
Tourism envisages (see Box 1) which, it can be seen, does not address the issue o f local management 
o f mineral resources.
L2 Objectives of the study
The objectives o f the study were formulated to: 
a  assess the rationale for local management o f mineral resources;
b. assess and evaluate policy and legal provisions as they relate to the relationship between the 
central government and local authorities and local communities vis-a-vis administration and 
management o f mineral resources and the benefits accruing from mineral exploitation;
c. collect views o f the main stakeholders on the issues involved;
d. evaluate proposals from stakeholders with respect to policy, legal, administrative and management 
implications; and
e. draw up a set o f recommendations. 89*
8 A study by Owen and Maponga (1996) highlighted the feet that RDCs’ benefit from mining is negligible. They 
estimated that of the 25 million dollars derived from mining in Mberengwa district, the council got $11, 000 
representing 0.004%. For Bubi, out of a total of 12 million dollars, the council got $5,000 representing 0.005%.
9' CAMPFIRE refers to Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. It was started in 1989
with two district councils: Nyaminyami and Guruve. By Statutory Instrument 313 of 1998 a total of 33 of the 57 
district councils now execute CAMPFIRE programmes. The programmes have seen an increase in wildlife due to 
effective management and less poaching. All proceeds accruing from CAMPFIRE operations are returned to the 
community by the RDCs. The council has no right to impose its wishes on people. It is the community's responsibility 
to decide on what projects to cany out. CAMPFIRE now includes wild animals, trees and fish.
2
Box 1: Elements o f the review of the Mines and Minerals Act as identified by the
Ministry o f Mines, Environment and Tourism
□ Reviewing the regulatory, fiscal, policy and institutional framework for mining with the objective of 
attracting more private sector investment to the mining sector on terms that are of mutual benefit to 
the investor and to the people of Zimbabwe
□ Establishing an internationally competitive climate for private sector investment in mining so that 
mining can make a contribution to employment creation, export earnings and economic growth in 
Zimbabwe
□ Simplify the regulatory regime in order to facilitate its enforcement and to streamline the administrative 
procedures
□ Enhance the efficient delivery of the technical and promotional services that the Ministry provides to 
the industry
□ An important component of the regulatory and policy framework for private sector investment in the 
mining sector is the ZiMTEP which seeks to address:
* mining titles and rentals
* computerisation of mining titles systems
* cost recovery on some services provided by the Ministry
* environmental protection issues
□ The Economic and Legal Advisory Services Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat is also 
assisting the Ministry on other aspects of the review.|10]
Source: MMET (1999)
L3 Methodology
Four steps were used in data gathering. First a review o f secondary information was undertaken. This 
review covered relevant pieces o f legislation such as the Rural District Councils Act (chapter 29: 13) 
and the Mines and Minerals Act (chapter 21: 05). Highlighting recent developments in the mining 
sector complemented this.
Second, general views of the main stakeholders namely, Chamber o f Mines, National Miners 
Association o f Zimbabwe and Association o f Rural District Councils were collected. Relevant 
government departments and NGOs were also consulted. Appendix VI lists the organisations that were 
consulted.
In addition three rural district councils, namely Mudzi, Mutoko and Guruve were visited between 9 
and 10 August 1999 to solicit their views on the issues. The first two are in Mashonaland East 
province while Guruve falls under Mashonaland Central province. The visits had two aims. The first 
was to gain some insights into CAMPFIRE projects as examples o f local management o f natural 
resources. The second was to assess the experiences o f the local councils with respect to mining 
activities within their areas. In each district chief executives, CAMPFIRE officers and financial 
officers were interviewed.
Fourth, developments in two key sectors - land and water - were studied with a view to determine 
whether these can be used in the mining sector. The Water Act, Chapter 20: 24 and the Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority Act, Chapter 20: 25 were analysed.
10 There was no information available on this.
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1.4 Demotions from the terms of reference and limitations of the study
During the study it became clear that proposals to bring mineral resources under local management 
involved answering a lot o f practical questions. As such the study concentrated on these practical 
aspects and did not venture into a theoretical discussion on tenure, natural resource management, local 
governance etc as required by the second activity o f die terms o f reference. However, the practical 
aspects are discussed in the context o f these issues.
It is also important to note that the study was compromised by the fact there are a number o f relevant 
laws that are still to be finalised e.g. the Environment Management Bill, and others that have been 
passed but are yet to be operationalised e.g. the Traditional Leaders Act o f 1998. The other limitation 
was that the review o f the Mines and Minerals Act is in its infancy. Consequently, there were no 
stakeholder views that could be evaluated as requested by the terms o f reference. Furthermore, the 
current review o f the constitution o f Zimbabwe, could yield some fundamental changes that may affect 
the discussion being undertaken here.
1.5 Structure of the report
The next section o f the report, section 2, identifies the key elements/dimensions along which the 
subject at hand is analysed. These dimensions will be captured through an assessment of:
□ the rationale for bringing mineral resources under local management;
□ whether a suitable policy environment exists;
□ whether a conducive legal framework does exist; and
□ whether the capacity o f RDCs and local communities to implement the desired changes exists.
Section 3 presents the main findings o f the study. Sections 4 and 5 present the conclusions and 
recommendations respectively.
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2 Critical Issues in Local Management of Mineral Resources
2. 1 Rationale for local management of mineral resources
There are a number o f reasons in favour o f local management o f mineral resources. CAMPFIRE 
projects seem to point to the fact that local management is the most appropriate way o f managing 
natural resources for a number o f reasons. First, local ownership o f resources is engendered, which 
makes local communities identify with die natural resources occurring within their areas. This fosters 
good stewardship o f the resources. For example, in CAMPFIRE projects the poaching o f wildlife was 
reduced. But is it not just for altruistic reasons that local management is beneficial. There are tangible 
economic benefits. Management costs are reduced as local communities take over some o f the 
responsibilities, which are normally done by public institutions. Also, real economic benefits accrue to 
the local people, which in turn encourage effective management o f natural resources. This is all the 
more important given that it is the local communities that bear the brunt o f mining activities within 
their areas. Local people can also act as cost effective watchdogs against flouting o f laid down rules.
The benefits extend to those local institutions diat provide services to local communities. In this 
discussion this refers to RDCs. Currently RDCs operate under provisions o f the Rural District 
Councils Act (chapter 29: 13). This gives the parameters within which RDCs can raise revenue for the 
general development o f the areas under their jurisdiction and how that money should be expended. 
Basically, RDCs raise their revenue through the collection o f rates, license fees and various levies, e.g. 
development levy. The central government also provides a grant. Makumbe (1996) notes that district 
councils, which used to operate in the communal areas, got as much as 80 % o f their annual budget 
from central government. With the amalgamation o f rural and district councils, central government, in 
some cases substantially reduced the grants it gave, depending on the revenue base o f the new RDCs. 
Because o f economic problems, the grants have dwindled over years. Parallel to this has been the 
decentralisation drive whereby RDCs are called upon to take up more responsibilities without 
corresponding financial resources. Many RDCs feel that minerals can provide the much-needed 
financial resources.
It can be concluded that there is a case for local management o f mining resources. The issue is what 
form it will take. This is the focus o f this study. The question is, can the CAMPFIRE concept be used 
in the mining sector? Below is an examination o f some o f the relevant issues.
2.2 The policy environment
Policy can be understood as a statement o f intent enunciated by central government (through its 
various institutions). Before addressing the details o f local management o f mineral resources a 
beginning point is to assess whether there is a suitable policy environment. I f  the policy does exist, 
what remains is to devise appropriate legal and administrative frameworks.
Local management o f minerals is to some extent a  political question as it touches on the general 
question o f governance dealing with the relationship between the centre (state) and the periphery 
(RDCs and local communities). It is therefore critical to examine how the GOZ defines this 
relationship, by looking at government's policy o f decentralisation. According to the ZIMPREST 
document, the government recognises the importance o f decentralisation:
Consistent with its policy o f  having the decisions that affect people's lives made by the people 
themselves, central government is to accelerate the pace o f decentralisation o f responsibility 
and increase access to resources to the Rural District Councils (RDCs) and urban local 
authorities during the [ZIMPREST] programme
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To this end,
An overall planning framework is to be established which will allow adequate financing o f 
RDCs with proper accountability. Over the ZIMPREST period, government is giving fu ll 
support to the RDC Capacity Building Programme, the objective o f which is to develop the 
capacity o f RDCs to plan, implement and manage their own development programmes and to 
provide and maintain essential services fo r  the rural population on sustainable basis.
It appears, however, that this decentralisation does not include control o f mineral resources. To quote 
the ZIMPREST document again:
During 1997, government is to conduct a comprehensive review o f taxation o f mining 
activities. The objective is to ensure that the tax system captures an appropriate share o f the 
returns from  exploiting mineral resources, while continuing to offer a competitive 
environment fo r  mining investment... In the regulatory sphere, particular attention is to be 
given to ensuring environmentally sustainable mining practices... incentives to encourage the 
local beneficiation o f mineral products are to be provided, including the manufacture o f gold 
and other jewellery, in order to enhance export and earnings and provide employment. 
(Emphasis added/
It is important to note that the local refers to the state. A conclusion could be made that there is some 
degree o f am bivalence regarding decentralisation process in die mining sector since die curren t 
legal fram ew ork negates the general decentralisation policy th a t is envisaged by the 
governm ent.
Box 2 (next page) gives some characteristics o f decentralisation. Evidence will be provided in this 
report, to the effect that there has been more deconcentration in the mining sector in that the Ministry 
o f Mines has set up local offices in die form o f a Mining Commissioner's office. Devolution, which is 
the ideal, is minimal - it is only evident in the relaxation o f gold panning regulations.1’11 Suggestions of 
how devolution can be achieved are given in later sections. One important thing to note is that 
devolution carried too far, becomes a disadvantage.
2.3 The Segal framework
Under the current legal framework, RDCs do not have the right to control mineral resources in their 
areas. This right is vested in the state through die President in terms o f section 2 o f the Mines and 
Minerals Act (Chapter 21: 05). (While this situation is not positive, it is worse for local communities 
who do not have any say whatsoever into how mining activities are conducted in their area). However, 
die law makes few concessions to die local authorities. RDCs have some say into how gold panning is 
conducted in their areas o f jurisdiction and receive some revenue from mining activities (see below).
Section 188 o f the Mines and Minerals Act entities RDCs to receive landowners' fees from mining 
activities that are undertaken in the communal areas under their jurisdiction. This is because, although 
the RDCs are not die legal owners o f the communal lands under their jurisdiction (the land belongs to 
the state, represented by the President) in terms of Section 4 o f the Communal Land Act, (Chapter 20: 
4). Sub-section 7 o f Section 188 specifically provides that they are regarded as the landowners for the 
purpose o f receiving landowners’ fees. This is pegged at $1.50 for an operational mine, and $0.60 for a 
non-operational mine. These fees are, however, not passed to local communities by the RDCs since 
there is no legal requirement to do so.
11. It needs to be said that government's decentralisation policy remains largely unelaborated.
6
Box 2: Characteristics o f decentralisation 
The principle
Decentralisation occurs when national governments share some of their power with other groups, 
particularly those that are either geographically dispersed, or are responsible for specific functions, or are 
given jurisdiction over specific physical locations. It is, however, no panacea for underdevelopment, 
poverty, disease etc.
Key elements o f the decentralisation process
Power, authority and responsibilities are diffused in such a way that they flow from the centre to the 
periphery, or to sections of the periphery, in a manner deliberately decided upon by the centre
Types o f decentralisation:
• Deconcentration is the transfer of adequate authority for the canying out of specified functions from 
central ministries and their agencies to staff of the same ministries or agencies situated outside the 
national headquarters
© Devolution is the transfer of legally defined elements of political power from local government units 
to specialised or functional authorities
a Delegation is the transfer of managerial responsibilities for functions that are specified from central 
government to public corporations or parastatals which normally lie outside the regular bureaucratic 
structure
• Privatisation occurs when central government divests itself of responsibility for certain functions or 
the provision of certain goods and services and transfers them to be performed or provided by 
voluntary, private or non-governmental organisations
Advantages o f decentralisation
• Excessive centralisation of state power and authority compromises good governance
• Achieves higher level of participation in decision-making, development planning and implementation 
which may result in political stability
e Ensures equity due to democratic participation
© Allows better communication for relevant development
• Reduces workload on central bureaucracy resulting in an improvement in the quality and quantity of 
services
© Enhances speed of delivery of services
• Facilitates better information gathering
Disadvantages o f decentralisation
e Can be divisive and separatist thereby negating national unity
• Reinforces narrow sectional interests, hence it is anti-egalitarian
© Tends to benefit certain classes of people at the expense of the generality of the people
• Can result in the creation of effective institutions of public control at the local level
® Results in the provision of inferior services due to absence of education and skills at the local level
Source: Makumbe (1998) _____________________________________________________ _
In terms o f Section 96:10(b) o f the Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29: 13) RDCs may charge 
levies to owners o f mining locations situated on rural land within their areas. The levy is based on 
either the number o f employees or the output in tonnes, depending on the type o f mineral (see 
appendix HI). RDCs complained o f encountering problems with the calculation formulae. The 
formula, based on the number o f employees, was said to be unworkable because the companies 
subcontracted some o f their operations to other companies. The sub-contracted companies employ
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temporary or casual labour who it was claimed, were not eligible for inclusion in the calculation,[,2] 
Moreover the output from the mine can be under-declared.
Under the Mining (Alluvial Gold) Public Streams Regulations, 1991 (Statutory Instrument 275, of 
1991), RDCs can apply for special grants from the Ministry o f Mines to enable them to licence gold 
partners. The RDCs are allowed to charge the partners licence fees. The rate o f the unit tax varies from 
council to council. Some of the RDCs have not applied for special grants because they are 
unaw are o f the procedures involved o r the procedures were unnecessarily difficult and 
cumbersome. Those who have applied indicated that the Ministry o f Mines was not very co-operative. 
For example, one had to keep making follow-ups if  die special grant is to be issued timeously. The 
situation was worsened by the fact that the special grant was renewed annually.
Currently RDCs do not access revenue from prospecting and licensing activities. This revenue is 
collected by the state. RDCs are also not receiving any o f the royalties’ payable under section 244 of 
the Mines and Minerals Act since these are not collected (see below). The income from prospecting 
and licensing is however, not that significant.
Another source o f revenue from the mining sector, which RDCs do not access, is income taxes - both 
individual and company taxes. In terms o f section 101 o f the Constitution o f Zimbabwe as read with 
the Income Tax Act (Chapter 23: 06) all taxes are payable to the state unless there is an Act o f 
Parliament to the contrary. At present there is no Act o f Parliament, which authorises the payment o f 
income tax to a body other than die state.
2.4 Implementation capacity
The proposal to bring local control o f mineral resources assumes that there is enough capacity within 
RDCs and local communities to implement the proposed changes. This does not seem to be the case. 
As can be noted in Appendices H, III and IV, there are challenges relating to technical, administrative 
and managerial capacity. Technical issues relate to compiling and interpreting a large database upon 
which to base the issuing o f prospecting licences. There is also a need for someone with a technical 
understanding to be able to supervise the mining operations. In terms o f administration, the challenges 
relate to:
□ setting up a simple and effective licensing system;
□ enforcing the rules that miners should follow;
□ organising an effective marketing system for various minerals; and
□ collection o f what is due to both central and local government.
It is important to note that currently many o f these responsibilities are undertaken by central 
government. Changing to local management may mean parallel structures at the national and local 
level. For example, die work that is currently being done by the MC's office would have to be taken 
over by RDC staff. The work o f MMCZ and the Reserve Bank would somehow have to be duplicated 
if  complete autonomy in mining is envisaged. However, a compromise can be arrived at whereby local 
councils co-operate with these institutions. This seems the best way forward given that currently RDCs 
do not have enough capacity. This will be covered in more detail under the section on 
recommendations. 2
l2' This is not true at all because, according to Section 1(3) of the Third Schedule to the Rural District Councils Act, the 
employees of the sub-contracted companies are to be regarded as employed by the owner of the mine for the purpose 
of the levy.
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2.5 O f rights and the environment
Proposals to bring minerals under local management raise the issue o f rights. In this discussion the 
issues relate to ownership o f minerals and its relationship to tenure. This, in turn, is related to the 
general issue o f governance as hinted in section 2.2. One o f the important responsibilities o f relevance 
here is management o f the environmental damage caused by mining.
First, as already discussed in section 2.3, all minerals are vested in the President (there is no surface 
ownership o f minerals). From an ownership point o f view this means that the rights that the fanner has 
to land bears no relationship with ownership o f minerals. This basically means that the minerals found 
in a locality do not belong to the local authority or local communities. As such claims o f local 
ownership, at least as defined in the law, do not arise. What is at stake is how the central government 
defines that usage. In the case o f water, where the reforms have been duly completed, the central 
government sets out the modalities o f the usage and also determines how the generated revenue is to 
be used.
There is no question that mining does damage the environment. The question is how this can be 
remedied. Early stages o f the Environment Management Bill were premised on the fact that the 
Ministry o f Mines, Environment and Tourism would have the sole responsibility o f administering the 
Act. For example, a draft o f the Bill had repealed those sections dealing with water pollution control in 
the Water A ct The major point here is whether local management o f mining activities will result in 
better management o f the environment. This depends on how the Environment Management Bill is 
administered and how local participation is encouraged. It is important to state that the review is still 
ongoing.
As hinted in section 1.3 the current review o f the country's constitution may change the existing 
situation. A dramatic change in the constitution regarding, say, the type o f local government and its 
structure can change how mining is conducted. For example a federal type o f government would allow 
local government to levy taxes on mining activities, which under the current constitution only the 
central government can.
2.6 Concluding remarks
There are many motives in favour o f local management o f mineral resources in Zimbabwe, which 
hitherto has not been the case. This was due to a legal framework that did not promote this at all. It 
was shown, however, that this unfavourable framework tended to go against government's declared 
goal o f decentralisation in all spheres o f the politico-socio-economic aspects o f Zimbabwe. In the 
following section, evidence in support o f this is given. In the same section are views that point to the 
desirability o f local management o f mineral resources as well as some steps that have been taken in 
this direction. Views to the contrary are also given. All this evidence will be used as a launch pad for 
the recommendations given in that section o f the report after the conclusions in section 4.
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3. Findings of the Study
The findings presented in this section are a mixture o f primary and secondary data. Presentation of the 
secondary data relates to recent developments in the mining sector vis-a-vis those in local 
management. First to be discussed is an elaboration o f recent developments in the mining sector vis-a- 
vis local management o f mineral resources. This is followed, in the second instance, by the general 
views of the different stakeholders. Thirdly is a presentation o f brief case studies o f three selected 
districts.
3. I Some recent developments vis-a-vis local management of mineral 
resources
There have been some changes in the mining sector vis-a-vis changes in local control o f mineral 
resources. These changes are best illustrated with regards to mining o f black granite in Mutoko and 
alluvial gold panning along rivers. The two cases illustrate different fortunes as far as local 
management o f mineral resources is concerned. The first case shows a reversal o f the situation while 
the second case shows some progress towards that goal. The cases show that information availability 
and simple administrative procedures are a key to meaningful local participation in the mining sector.
3.1.1 Black granite
The case o f black granite illustrates what is generally considered negative as far as local management 
o f mineral resources. In 1990, the classification o f granite was changed from a stone to a mineral. This 
effectively transferred regulatory powers to the state. The RDCs of Mutoko, Mudzi and Uzumba 
Maramba Pfungwe (UMP) have complained bitterly about the loss o f revenue from quarrying 
operations ever since black granite was declared a mineral. As a consequence, it is claimed, miners 
were no longer obliged to pay royalties1131 to the host RDCs.
Apart from the loss o f revenue it is claimed that the environment suffered since there was no effort to 
protect it. For example, heavy vehicles and an increase in the volume o f traffic resulted in the 
deterioration o f the road infrastructure. The ravaged landscape o f barren gullies and holes filled with 
water has become a breeding ground for mosquitoes (see below). It was not clear to researchers 
whether the environment was better protected then, than compared to the present?
3.1.2 Alluvial gold panning
Gold panning provides alternative employment and also contributes to the national economy. The 
H erald1141 estimated that over 2 000 small-scale miners accounted for 5% o f the country's annual gold 
production. By 1995 there were over 500 registered small-scale miners with over 60% being fully 
employed. The 1991/92 drought resulted in a significant increase in the number o f people involved in 
gold panning. Retrenchments have had similar effects. But gold panning has disadvantages especially 
if  it is unregulated. The Financial GazettefJ51 stated that as o f 1987 gold panning resulted in Zimbabwe 
losing between 10 to 15 million dollars in foreign currency earnings. Environmental damage has been 
observed. For example the Department o f Natural Resources expressed concern about siltation caused 
by gold paimers. 1345
13 It would appear that Councils were getting leasing fees rather than royalties since royalties were last collected in the 
mid-1970s.
14'Herald, 12 November 1997.
15 Financial Gazette, 29 April 1998.
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In an attempt to bring order to alluvial gold panning activities the government, by Statutory Instrument 
275 o f 1991 Mining (Alluvial Gold) (Public Streams) Regulations, Chapter 165, Section 247 o f the 
Mines and Minerals Act, legalised gold panning. By this statutory instrument, "council" means a rural 
council established in terms o f the Rural District Council Act. A "resident" refers to a person who is 
entitled in terms o f any law to reside permanently in council areas.
Under Statutory Instrument 275, only the Ministry o f Mines can issue special grants to councils[161. 
Every council is required by law to identify public streams in its council area where gold deposits are 
found. Upon identification o f the public streams the council applies to the Secretary o f Mines in terms 
o f Section 274 o f the Act for the issue o f a special grant for the working o f alluvial gold deposits in 
respect o f those identified stretches o f public streams. An application for the issue o f a special grant 
may be obtained from the Mining Commissioner. A fee o f $40 is payable in respect o f the issue o f a 
special grant. The Secretary o f Mines consults the Natural Resources Board (NRB) when issuing the 
special grant. A special grant is renewed annually which administratively is a problem.
For a public stream in respect o f which a special grant has been issued, it has to be beaconed in 
accordance with the directions o f the Mining Commissioner. The council has to maintain all beacons 
in good order until a quittance certificate is issued by the MC. The council demarcates streams by 
means o f pegs in such a manner as the MC may direct into stretches not exceeding 50 metres each.
To be eligible for an alluvial gold panning permit, one must be over 18 years, a resident o f the council 
area and o f good character. Vetting for good character is usually done by Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) and other state security agents. The permit can be issued to a co-operative society 
or any form o f partnership provided they are residents o f the district and o f good character. As o f 
1991 an annual fee o f $20 was paid for each 50-m stretch. Nowadays, each council issued with a 
special grant determines the annual fee. Other requirements o f the permit are the need to always have 
it on site and that the people employed must be fit and responsible. Residents and any person who 
breaches any condition o f his permit are guilty o f an offence. This may result in the permit being 
cancelled. In an attempt to conserve the environment, it is a requirement o f the law that a public stream 
that has been mined shall be rehabilitated by backfilling as mining operations progress.
RDCs are supposed to maintain an up-to-date register o f all permit holders in their areas. Councils 
must also maintain all records o f alluvial gold obtained in terms o f these regulations. All records 
obtained by the RDCs have to be forwarded to the MC on a monthly basis. The gold so obtained must 
be disposed to a holder o f a gold dealing licence. Due to the absence o f an organised marketing 
system, most gold is sold through non-official channels. What would be ideal is for the market to be 
close by thereby removing the temptation to sell gold to illegal dealers.
Officers o f RDCs, MC inspectors or mines, police officers, any agent o f the Reserve Bank, any 
officers o f the Department o f Natural Resources (DNR) and Department o f National Parks may 
enforce the regulations. They have powers to give direction to the permit holder as to the proper 
working o f alluvial gold deposits, terminate operations and obtain the cancellation o f the permit by the 
council.
The above shows the experimental role the RDCs have had in local management o f mineral resources. 
There have been two major weaknesses with this system. First RDCs are hardly aware o f the 
procedures involved. Second this is not complemented by an efficient market system for the gold. 
Though people with gold dealing licences are on the increase, illegal gold dealers still continue to play 
a major role in buying the precious metal. 16
16 RDCs, which have been provided with the authority to issue gold panning permits among others, include Mwenezi, 
Mudzi, Chivi and Guruve.
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3.2 Views of stakeholders
3.2.1 M inistry o f M ines, Environm ent and Tourism  (MMET)
MMET is in the process o f reviewing the Mines and Minerals Act. This is a three-year programme that 
started in August 1998 under the Zimbabwe Mining Titles and Environment Project (ZiMTEP). The 
project is aimed to gather the views of stakeholders so as to come up with an Act, which is simple to 
administer, and is efficient. The first stakeholder workshop was held on 2-3 June 1999. Box 1 (see 
section 1) summarises the proceedings o f the workshop. The views o f the Ministry on a number o f 
topics were also solicited. These are reported hereunder.
a) Charges/Ievies: It was explained that there were a number o f charges/levies that are paid/collected 
in the mining sector (see Table 1.).
Table 1: Charges in die mining sector
Charge/Fees Paid and Received by Purpose
Prospecting miners to government administration of applications
Inspection miners to government monitoring of mining activities
Royalties not being paid payment for rights to mine
Landowners government to landowners compensation for loss of land
Unit tax miners to RDCs servicing of roads
Personal and corporate tax miners to government government revenue
Source: Research notes
The various fees paid were said to be sub-economic. For example the application for a prospecting 
licence pegged at $150 and the certificate itself at $300 were said to be a fraction o f the 
administrative costs. Similarly, landowner’s fees were low at $1.50 per ha for an operational mine 
and $0.60 for a non-operational one.
It was communicated that royalties were not being collected in Zimbabwe. They were last 
collected in 1975. The collection was stopped so as to attract investment in the mining sector when 
the country was isolated during the Unilateral Declaration o f Independence (UDI) years. The GOZ 
has not revoked this rule. The Ministry was said not to be in a position to undertake its monitoring 
role because o f lack o f human and financial resources. There was now a campaign that, instead o f 
the money going to treasury, some o f it would be retained - say 25% - to finance the monitoring o f 
mining activities.
b) EPOs: EPOs were said to be necessary to attract huge investment in the mining sector. The 
Ministry was aware that small-scale operators considered this unfair. Although these claimed 
unfair treatment is was noted that they could apply for authority to mine from the holder o f the 
EPO. (This was however, no real consolation as the holder o f the EPO could deny permission.) It 
was stressed that EPOs could not be used for speculative purposes because holders were required 
to submit six monthly progress reports. Besides an EPO could not be held for more than 5 years.
c) M ineral rights: There was no prospect o f the government changing the current status o f 
ownership o f mineral rights in the country. Therefore the suggestion that communities or RDCs be 
given rights to minerals (or change to surface ownership o f minerals) was said to be unlikely to be 
accepted. This was because o f three main reasons. First investors do not commit themselves to
12
investing their money where mineral rights do not belong to the government. Governments 
provide security. A study undertaken by the Ministry exploring a number o f African and non- 
African countries confirmed this fact. The study found that where local ownership had been tried 
no meaningful investment was attracted e.g. in Canada. The same was reported in South Africa 
where areas o f local ownership, carved out during the apartheid era, did not attract investment. The 
new democratic government in South Africa was said to be finding ways o f reversing this. Second, 
some communities may reject investment for no good reason. Third, the experience with gold 
panning shows that local authorities may not have the capacity to assume the immense 
responsibilities local management o f mineral resources entails. Training may alleviate this.
d) Local participation: It was also noted that although local authorities had failed in the discharge o f 
their duties vis-a-vis gold panning there was a need and scope for local participation. It should, 
however, be borne in mind that this local 'failure' was in circumstances where:
© there was little to no co-operation from the Ministry 
© virtually no resources were made available for this new role 
© there was little incentive in the light o f benefits accruing to RDCs.
Further the annual renewal o f the special grant was a problem. Although the renewal could be 
started 2 months before this extended beyond that.
3.2.2 Mining Commissioner’s office
The MC's office, it was said, provided yearly information to RDCs on labour and production data. 
This information, based on returns submitted by mines, formed the basis o f determining the unit tax. It 
was, however, conceded that there was a chance o f under-declaring by mining concerns. The MC had 
also a duty to compute landowners' fees. The landowners' fees were sometimes not paid on time 
resulting in many complaints. The fees were also said to be too low.
Local participation was said to be assured through the District Advisory Board, which was chaired by 
the MC. Government departments e.g. Geological Services and Metallurgy, were represented. There 
were also three representatives from CFU, Chambers o f Mines and the National Miners Association o f 
Zimbabwe (it is significant that ZFU, ICFU and RDCs were not represented on this board). This board 
deliberated on issues affecting mining. For example it had authority to declare some areas reserved 
(from mining activities) e.g. where mining operations would jeopardise the environment.
3.2.3 Ministry o f Local Government
The Ministry ruled out local ownership o f mineral resources on the grounds that local authorities were 
failing to make maximum use o f the current responsibility they were entrusted with. For example 
RDCs had the right to fix the unit tax and yet they collected very little revenue. In some cases there 
was no collection at all. No application to increase the rate o f unit tax was ever received by the 
Ministry. Also the authority to administer gold panning was not being used to the full. It was also 
argued that the unit tax was the "environment tax", hence die complaints that the environment was 
damaged and nothing was being done was baseless.
It was stressed that RDCs were the appropriate authority in the communal areas that could delegate 
authority to lower levels. There was, therefore, it was claimed, no chance that government would allow 
communities to be the appropriate authority. Furthermore the community was a very dicey concept 
which was difficult to operationalise.
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3.2.4 M ineral M arketing C orporation o f Zimbabwe (MMCZ)
An official from MMCZ maintained that MMCZ's monopoly should continue if  government is to get 
the most revenue from mining. The fear was expressed that if  mining companies conducted their own 
business government will be financially prejudiced.
3.2.5 Cham ber o f Mines
The Chamber o f Mines argued that MMCZ is not necessary especially for big mining organisations. It 
was suggested that large companies be allowed to deal directly with outside customers. The new 
MMCZ role would be to monitor prices and assist small-scale miners who might not have the capacity 
to produce and export directly.
3.2.6 N ational M iners Association o f Zimbabwe (NMAZ)
NMAZ was o f the opinion that RDCs should have input into the management o f minerals. They 
should also benefit from the mining activities. Those mining activities, which RDCs could have a say 
in, include gold panning, black granite, and chrome along the Great Dyke.
The same sentiments were echoed by RDCs that were visited (see next section). Basically these called 
for the amendment o f the Mines and Minerals Act so that they could benefit more. It was claimed that 
this would allow them to fight environmental degradation due to mining.
3.2.7 Association of R ural D istrict Councils (ARDC)
ARDC was in favour o f RDCs getting a fair share o f the mineral resources in their areas. ARDC 
referred die researchers to the study done by Owen and Maponga (1996) as representing their views 
(they commissioned the study). This particular study suggested that RDCs could get more revenue 
from mining through:
□ setting up joint ventures with mining companies
□ hiring out mining equipment to miners
□ sharing corporate tax with the government.
3.2.8 M udzi D istrict
It was said that the Council gets some money from central government. This was, however, said to be 
too small and erratic.
a) CAM PFIRE activities: CAMPFIRE activities in the district are concentrated in two locations 
under the auspices o f the Natural Resource Committees. The idea o f a CAMPFIRE project in the 
district dates back to 1984 when there was a proposal to set up a joint venture with Nyanga RDC 
in the Rwenya area. This area had a variety o f animals such as kudu and elephant. In 1986 Nyangi 
RDC pulled out o f the project due to unavailability o f funds. Because Mudzi did not have an ares 
big enough to set up a CAMPFIRE project, it went into partnership with Rushinga and Uzumba 
Maramba Pfungwe (UMP). The CAMPFIRE programme started in 1993 and a safari operator was 
appointed who pays a concession fee o f US$10 000 per annum.
In 1993 a total of$60 000 was collected. In 1998 the figure reached $150 000. The revenue was 
said to be split equally among the three councils. Out o f the total share paid to the council, 30% 
went to die council for administrative purposes. The remaining 70% went to the affected 
communities who decided what to do with the money. CAMPFIRE proceeds have been used to 
buy stationery for school children, construction o f classroom blocks and acquisition o f cattle for 
draught power. However, the Chief Executive thought that the CAMPFIRE projects were not 
doing particularly well.
14
b) M ining: Gold panning is mainly concentrated along the Rwenya, Mazowe and Manyuchi rivers in 
the Makaha area Mudzi was among the first o f few councils who applied for a special grant so 
that it could issue permits for gold panning. It was during the inception phase between 1994 and 
1995 that people were issued with permits. The permit was pegged at Z$50. As o f 1999 the permit 
attracted a fee o f Z$520. A single person was currently reported to have paid for it. Part o f the 
problem was that the Ministry took a long time to renew the special grant.
The pegging and monitoring o f grants is the responsibility o f the council and other agencies as 
provided for in the statutory instrument. The council currently employs three ward promoters and 
six resource monitors. A promoter earns $1200 per month while a resource monitor earns $690.
Some members o f the community are responsible for pegging the grants and ensuring that the 
legal requirements o f undertaking mining activity 30 m from the bank hold. It was agreed that 
these sometimes colluded with villagers thereby causing illegal gold panning. Illegal gold panning 
is said to be perpetrated mainly by people coming from outside the district. The council, together 
with the ZRP, does their best to control illegal gold panners. This, however, met limited success 
because o f limitations in manpower resources, poor co-operation from other agencies such as the 
Ministry o f Mines and the fear that they may somehow breach the law.
There was also a conflict between those with prospecting permits and those gold panning permits 
issued by RDCs. Holders o f prospecting licences, who by law could not be supervised by 
councils, frequently encroached on die 30m limit. Complaints to the Ministry yielded nothing. The 
council has no say over the marketing o f gold, and the RDC's application to be a gold trader was 
turned down. Panners are legally supposed to sell to the Reserve Bank but this did not happen, and 
therefore the illegal sale o f gold was rife.
Mudzi has minerals other than gold. However, there was insufficient information about mining in 
the district. It was said that the council got land ownership fees and in the 1997/98 year it was 
claimed that some $97 000 was obtained via the Ministry. However, the council did not manage 
to collect unit tax because o f a lack o f co-operation from the Ministry and the miners themselves.
3.2.9 Mutoko District
Ever since black granite was classified as a mineral in 1990 the council is said to have lost a lot o f . 
money (no figures were offered). The unit tax system is said not to work as false information can be 
given. For example the tonnage and number o f employees cannot be verified.
Researchers were fold o f a conflict between the communities and the quarry operators. This was 
because o f wanton opening up o f roads and dumping o f rocks in arable lands by miners. There was no 
rehabilitation o f the environment. The Ministry (o f Mines) was said not to want to do anything. This 
has frustrated some people to the point o f barricading roads. Some companies were, however, said to 
have contributed towards road maintenance and the construction o f schools.
Black granite extraction was different to gold panning in that it was a capital-intensive venture, and 
therefore locals could not participate. Only joint ventures could be used where local people or council 
could enter into partnerships.
3.2.10 Guruve
Guruve is the pioneer CAMPFIRE district. The programme started in 1989. It was targeted at elephant, 
buffalo, cheetah, leopard and lion. Out o f 31 wards in the district, 14 wards were involved in 
CAMPFIRE projects.
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In 1997 $4m was realised from CAMPFIRE projects. In 1998 the realisation was $10m. Out o f the 
total revenue the council got 17% as an administrative fee. The balance was given to the communities 
where the animals were killed.
Illegal gold panning is rampant in the district. The council has not applied for a special grant. This is 
because o f their lack o f knowledge, by the RDCs' own admission. The council has, therefore, been 
compromised in terms o f revenue and exercising control over mining activities. There was no 
consolidated information available on mining activities in the district. Just as in the case o f Mudzi, the 
council felt that it was prejudiced o f revenue from mining activities in the district.
3.2.11 CAMPFIRE Association
The first observation was that the existing legislation, in the form o f the Mines and Minerals Act, did 
not facilitate community participation in the management o f minerals. The CAMPFIRE Association 
believes that communities should own the resources that occur within their neighbourhood and that 
they should have a voice in the management o f their resources. The idea is to let communities manage 
their own resources. As the appropriate authority, RDCs should merely be facilitators.
It was submitted that local ownership o f minerals may be based on the size o f operations, with bigger 
operations falling under the national government. Land tenure was also an important part o f the 
equation as under the present Act the landowner loses control over what happens once minerals are 
discovered. It was also recognised that local communities could be ripped o ff if  left to negotiate their 
own contracts. They could also turn away investors.
Some specific proposals for changes to the Mines and Minerals Act were that some minerals needed to 
be de-classified so that local people could benefit from them; and also that appropriate authority 
should be given to these local communities.
3.2.12 Zimbabwe Trust
The challenge was to get the government to accept local management o f mineral resources (given the 
substantial revenue that die government gets from the mining sector). Mutoko is an ample 
demonstration o f that fact - the re-classification o f black granite into a mineral was because central 
government saw that the Mutoko Rural District Council was deriving substantial revenue.
It was understood that the Ministry was having a second look at the Mines and Minerals Act with a 
view to affording councils more benefits from the mining sector. How councils will pass on the 
benefits to communities is open to. question especially if  there is no legal framework. Legally, councils 
- as the appropriate authority - can appropriate the benefits. However, under CAMPFIRE, councils 
accepted to share the benefits under a Minister's directive as a strategic compromise for the pragmatic 
reason that local communities would poach the wildlife.
A viable alternative to the current situation would be to have mining companies pay royalties to the 
RDCs with specific instruction to turnover (part of) the proceeds to local communities. Another way 
was to ensure that local communities negotiated with mining concerns. For example, there could be an 
understanding by the mining concerns that: a) local people should be employed; and b) instead o f 
providing amenities to concentrated settlements for their workers, they could provide electricity, piped 
water, good roads and other facilities to the neighbouring villages from where the majority o f their 
workers would come. Some o f the services could even be made available at a cost.
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3.3 Comparison with developments in other sectors
3.3.1 Water
The legal frameworks in the water sector are now in place in the form o f the ZINWA Act (Chapter 20: 
25) and the Water Act (Chapter 20: 24). The major points that are important to highlight for this 
discussion include the fact that the country is divided into seven catchment councils (CCs). These CCs 
are the equivalent o f mining districts. The CCs are constituted by elected representatives from the sub­
catchment councils. SCCs are in turn made up o f representatives from water user associations who in 
turn are composed o f water point committee representatives. The ZINWA Board is the overall 
overseer o f water resources in the country. On the ZINWA Board sit representatives o f water users. It 
needs to be pointed out that the lowest level o f appropriate authority is the SCCs who have powers to 
collect levies. The CCs are the planning authority. Figure 1 presents a simplified organisational 
structure in the water sector. It can be seen that local communities will be involved. It is clear that an 
inter-sectoral approach was adopted (which was a realisation that sustainable natural resource 
management is best not confined to sectoral boundaries).
3.3.2 Land
The Ministry o f Lands and Agriculture provided information to the effect that:
□ in the communal areas no titles to land will be given to communities; communities will be issued a 
certificate which acknowledges the existence o f that entity as a village;
□ communal areas will continue to be state land with RDCs being the appropriate authority; and
□ there was a strong possibility that land boards will be formed according to the format shown in 
Figure 2.
Figure 1: Simplified organisational structure in  the water sector
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Figure 2: Possible structure o f land boards
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4. Conclusions
The findings contained in section 3 lead us to make major conclusions regarding local management o f 
mineral resources in Zimbabwe. The conclusions that are made here are more or less according to the 
dimensions that were posed in section 2  as the general analytical framework.
4.1 A case for local management of mineral resources
It was clear that currently mining activities in Zimbabwe are centralised in the state from prospecting 
right to marketing. This situation was described as unfortunate as the efficiency and effectiveness of 
managing mineral resources was compromised because:
□ the State, however well meaning, was not in a position to effectively monitor all the mining 
activities (human and financial resources were said to be in short supply);
□ local people could not help (and thus reduce management costs) because o f the legal position; and
□ local management engenders local stewardship o f natural resources, which, in the end results in a 
sustainable natural resource management.
The situation was worsened by the fact that it was the local people who suffered die environmental 
consequences. In some cases this directly affected the livelihoods o f the people. For example in 
Mutoko arable land was lost because o f mining activities.
With regards to benefit sharing it was revealed that:
□ the negligible benefits, less than 0 .01%, that accrue to local authorities were neither enough to 
compensate for the losses suffered by local people nor to generate interest in natural resource 
conservation;
□ a number o f RDCs were not aware that they could apply for a special grant with which they could 
regulate gold panning within their areas;
□ those that were aware were compromised by the administrative bottlenecks that required diem to 
apply annually; and
□ there was an alleged problem with the collection o f unit tax; the contention o f the RDCs was that 
the formula was complex which was not entirely true. The real problem was lack o f adequate 
information, a situation that was not helped by the alleged lack o f co-operation from the Ministiy 
o f Mines.
The question therefore was not whether local management o f mineral resources was desirable but what 
form it will take, hence the investigation into whether the concept o f CAMPFIRE could be used. Some 
of die possibilities are discussed under the section o f recommendations.
4.2 A generally supportive policy environment
An examination o f the ZIMPREST document, the most authoritative government policy statement, 
revealed that there was in general a supportive policy, in the form o f decentralisation, into which local 
management o f mineral resources could be located. It could thus be concluded that the absence o f 
decentralisation in the mining sector was an anomaly because:
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□ government had a well enunciated decentralisation policy designed to allow people to participate 
in decisions that affect their lives;
□ there was demonstrable decentralisation in some sectors that promoted participation o f local 
communities e.g. the water and land sectors; and
□ the enhanced revenue base would result in local authorities being better able to perform their 
functions, which is also what the government seeks to achieve.
It is, therefore, important for RDCs and local communities to lobby government to allow management 
o f local resources to come under local control so that the current policy gaps are plugged. However, it 
is recommended (see section 5) that joint management, where the state retains some influence, is the 
best option because:
□ the technical capacity o f the RDCs is not high enough to equip them to take over some of the 
specialised tasks that are currently being undertaken by the Ministry;
□ central government does invest in research and development o f the mining sector which 
emphasises the fact that the state has a role to play in the sector; and
□ co-ordination is necessary -  as individual RDCs would find it expensive to set up administrative 
structures.
4.3 Problematic Segal framework
The evidence presented showed that local management o f mineral resources was currently impeded by 
a problematic legal framework, which did not promote local management. Aspects that went against 
local management included:
□ centralised issuing o f prospecting licences to the exclusion o f RDCs and local communities;
□ existence o f EPOs which favoured large mining concerns;
□ annual renewal o f special grants;
□ restricting RDCs to the collection o f landowners' fees and unit tax;
□ RDCs not allowed to share income tax (personal and corporate); and
□ RDCs (allegedly) being barred from acting as gold traders.
Coupled to the above was inadequate information on the part o f RDCs, which was not helped by an 
uncooperative Ministry o f Mines. Later in the report are proposals about what steps should be taken if 
local management o f mineral resources is to become a reality.
4.4 Divergent views of stakeholders
The views of stakeholders were presented. These can be categorised along the lines o f government 
departments, NGOs and RDCs.
a) Governm ent departm ents 
These were:
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• categorical regarding die desirability o f die existing ownership o f mineral rights, that is to say 
no surface ownership o f mineral rights as this was said to jeopardise investment in the mining 
sector and was generally unprecedented in the world as revealed by the study undertaken by 
the Ministry;
« opposed to local management, which had been shown not to work by the failure o f RDCs to 
collect the revenues they were entitled to and the poor administration o f gold panning permits; 
and
• determined that RDCs would continue to be the appropriate authority in communal areas.
The lack o f interest in local management o f mineral resources on the part o f government 
departments was perhaps epitomised by M M ET's direction o f review o f the Mines and Minerals 
Act which gave no room for local management (see Box 1).
b) NGOs
NGOs were o f the opinion that local management o f mineral resources was the best option since 
these compensated local communities who bore the cost o f living with the resources. Specifically 
they advocated that:
e appropriate authority be given to local communities;
• with the appropriate authority - local communities could negotiate directly with the mining 
concerns; and
9 central government and RDCs should merely be die facilitators.
c) ARDCS
The ARDCs were o f the opinion that RDCs could get more revenue from the mining sector 
through:
• hiring out equipment to miners;
• participating in joint ventures; and
• sharing income tax with government.
d) RDCs
Submissions from RDCs could be summarised thus:
© RDCs were concerned with the negligible benefits they received from mining activities;
© they wanted a mechanism to be in place to enable diem to get more revenue from mining; 
o they did not specifically ask that die mineral rights needed to be changed;
• they did not believe that joint ventures in mining would work as this would not be a 
partnership o f equals; and
• they also acknowledged on their part that they lacked information, which was not provided by 
the Ministry.
The challenge is to have fora where there can be an exchange o f views so as to find a way forward. 
Some suggestions are made in the next section.
4.5 Implementation challenges
The evidence presented showed that local management o f mineral resources entails a number o f 
implementation challenges. The challenges were made all the more demanding because o f poor 
information on the part o f RDCs who are supposed to champion this local management. Without 
adequate information implementation cannot be effective. Areas where capacity building is needed 
included:
□ collation o f information on mining activities so as to come up with a proper mining register
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□ awareness o f procedures o f applying special grants
□ enforcing rules and regulations o f various miners e.g. protecting the environment
□ acquisition o f mining output and labour data for purposes o f determining revenue
□ basing with MMCZ and RBZ on marketing o f minerals e.g. RDCs being designated gold traders 
to reduce illegal gold marketing.
4.6 Wider issues at play
The discussion on local management o f mineral resources cannot be discussed in isolation as it touches 
on die issue o f governance, which defines the (power) relationship between the centre (the state) and 
the periphery (local authorities and communities). It was noted that there was little devolution in the 
mining sector. This was not a recipe for empowerment o f local communities and RDCs. The point was 
also made that rights are a critical element o f tills relationship. With regard to the mining sector it is 
important to note that:
□ rights to minerals are vested in the state through the president;
□ tenure does not have any relationship with rights to minerals since there was no surface ownership 
o f mineral rights to Zimbabwe; and
□ there was limited scope for local participation vested in RDCs as the appropriate authority in the 
rural areas o f Zimbabwe.
It was also noted that there were a number o f laws in the making or yet to be operational which have a 
significant bearing on the local management o f mineral resources. Also the current review o f the 
constitution could significantly alter the debate on local management o f mineral resources.
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5. Recommendations
From the preceding sections it is clear that local management o f mineral resources can only become a 
reality if  a number o f steps are taken. In particular the policy and legal frameworks need attention. 
Once these are sorted out a suitable administrative framework can be instituted. Below are 
recommendations o f how this can be achieved.
The recommendations are in two parts and of a general nature in that there is no recommendation on 
individual minerals. First is a presentation o f recommendations for action at the local level. These are 
o f a short-term nature and are mainly concerned with making local communities and RDCs exploit to 
the full opportunities that are present within the existing legislation. The CAMPFIRE Association can 
render assistance in this regard. Second to be presented are recommendations that pertain to the 
national level. These can only be realised after changes to the legislation as well as to policy. As such 
this deals mainly with issues o f advocacy.
5. I The IocgI level
The evidence that has been presented provides a good basis upon which CAMPFIRE project 
interventions can be instituted at the local level. It has been shown that lack o f information is the main 
hindrance. To this end capacity building o f RDCs and local communities should centre on providing 
the information. The information required is o f a general and administrative nature.
a) General
RDCs and local communities need information on:
« minerals and mining operations within their areas o f jurisdiction;
• labour employed in the mining operations as well as the output which are critical to the 
determination o f unit tax;
e revenue generated from the mining operations in the respective RDCs and how it is shared;
•  landowners' entitlements and how the fees are paid and shared; and
a environmental impacts o f the mining operations and how they are being managed.
This exercise will result in an inventory o f mining-related activities in different localities, which in 
time will form local mining databases.
b) Administrative
RDCs and local communities need information on:
• structure and functioning o f the mining industry in general
a procedures concerning the determination o f unit tax, how it is actually determined and how it 
can be reviewed
• procedures concerning application o f special grants to issue gold panning permits
• representation in the District Advisory Board.
There is also a need to provide information on how the changes proposed or contained in the Land 
Policy, Traditional Leaders Act, the Water Act and Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act and the 
< Environmental Management Bill will impact on local management o f natural resources.
To this end it is proposed that (mining) district-based workshops be held at which these issues will be 
discussed. Such workshops are advantageous as they bring together the local actors. Table 2 (below) 
contains some suggestions. The outputs from such an exercise will be:
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□ knowledge and skills acquisition by RDCs and leaders o f local communities
□ local minerals and mining databases
□ mapping out o f "producer communities"
□ position paper for input into the current review o f the Mines and Minerals Act. 17
Table 2: Suggestions for proposed mining district-based workshops
TASKS FACILITATORS
Convenors CAMPFIRE Association and CASS
Venues Masvingo, Gwanda, Harare, Bulawayo, 
Kadoma
Workshop attendants Chief Executive of RDCs, Chairmen of RDCs, 
CAMPFIRE project managers,
Provincial Administrators, District 
Administrators, traditional leaders (only 
chiefs), Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Opening speeches Provincial Govemor(s)
ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION'171
* Inventory of mining operations in the 
mining district and various RDCs
* How to apply for the special grant for the 
purpose of issuing gold permits
* Determination and payment of landowners' 
fees
Mining Commissioner's office
* Composition and Sanctions of the district 
advisory board
* Relationship between national and local 
environment management
Ministry of Mines, Environment and Tourism
* New institutions and their role in rural 
development
* Determination and payment of unit tax
Ministry of Local Government
* Envisaged land management structures and 
their respective roles
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture
* Challenges facing RDCs as facilitators of 
development
Provincial administrators
# These are the head offices o f the mining districts where Mining Commissioners’ offices are located.
17 Some of the items can be assigned to consultants.
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5.2 The national level
It is important to note that local and national levels cannot he completely separated since local issues 
are affected by national policies. The point that flows from this is: since local issues are affected by 
national policies, whose responsibility will it be to spearhead advocacy regarding policy and legal 
changes to favour local management o f mineral resources? It is suggested here that this responsibility 
be shared between the Association o f Rural District Councils, CAMPFIRE Association and CASS. 
The first organisation should take die leading role.
A national workshop after the proposed (mining) district workshops is suggested. ARDC will be the 
main convenor with the CAMPFIRE Association and CASS playing a supporting role. A number of 
issues that need to be addressed are presented hereunder. The main output will be a joint position 
paper to be presented to the Ministry o f Mines for possible inclusion in the new Mines and Minerals 
Act.
a) Refining the policy framework
While an overall government policy o f decentralisation does not oppose local management o f 
natural resources (including minerals) it is not specific enough to promote it. To this end it is 
recommended that the government be encouraged to be clear on this issue.
For example, with regard to resources, the ZIMPREST document says that, “central government 
is to accelerate the pace o f decentralisation o f responsibility and increase access to resources to the 
Rural District Councils (RDCs)...” (GOZ, 1998: 16) It is not clear whether this includes natural 
resources. Adding the words including access to natural resources may strengthen the case o f 
local management o f mineral resources. This would be in line with developments in the water and 
land sectors.
h) Legal changes
If local management o f minerals is to be realised changes to the present Mines and Minerals Act 
will have to facilitate rather than frustrate it. However, as noted elsewhere in this report, even 
under the present legislation local management o f mineral resources can be accommodated. Given 
that the government is unlikely to countenance revising mineral rights (i.e. cede them to RDCs or 
local communities) it is suggested that there is no merit in lobbying for:
• mineral rights to be vested in the body other than the state (which is in conformity with 
international trends)
• the appropriate authority in communal areas to be moved from RDCs as this goes against 
government's declared policy.
Thus, local management o f mineral resources can proceed under a ministerial directive just as was 
done when CAMPFIRE was first launched. Once that principle is agreed to secondary legislation 
can be put in place (in the form o f rules and regulations that lay out how local management o f 
mineral resources is to be undertaken). Areas, which should be addressed by the secondary 
legislation, include:
• Special grants for minerals other than gold: The decision to issue special grants for minerals 
other than gold could be based on the relative abundance o f the mineral in the locality. This 
should perhaps take into account the nature o f the mineral itself e.g. minerals that are deemed 
to be o f critical national importance can be excluded from the special grant. Interest from local 
communities and RDCs should also be a consideration. In this regard the suggestion by
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NAMZ that RDCs control gold, chrome and black (as well as white) granite can be used as a 
good starting point.118'
• RDCs, as the appropriate authority in communal areas, should continue to issue the special 
grants
o Special grants should be issued on five-year rollover basis to avoid cases o f the grant lapsing 
and thereby jeopardising the issuing o f permits. This means that after the first five years the 
special grant is automatically renewed unless otherwise decided by the Ministry. This gives 
RDCs ample time to renew the special grant
0 Landowners' fees should be issued to RDCs, as is the present system with the provision that 
(part of) the money is given to local communities who are affected by the mining activities. 
The prospect o f village certificates defining the boundaries o f different villages makes this 
easy to administer.
•  RDCs should continue to collect unit tax. This tax should primarily be used to repair roads 
damaged by mining activities.
® EPOs need to be revised to reflect the sentiments o f local management o f mineral resources,
c) Institutional arrangem ents
Local management o f mineral resources cannot effectively occur under existing administrative
arrangements since these make the Ministry o f Mines the only meaningful player. I f  the principle
of joint-management is accepted whereby both the state, RDCs and local communities play a role,
administrative arrangements should reflect this. To this end the following need attention:
» An inclusive representative structure overseeing mining affairs is needed. The present five 
mining districts in the country are a good base for local management. The current District 
Advisory Board should be expanded to take on board players other than the Ministry, CFU, 
big mining concerns and small scale miners that are currently represented. Other players that 
should be included are RDCs, as the delegated land authority in the communal areas (this can 
be through the Association o f Rural District Councils), communal and resettlement farmers as 
another level o f "landowners" (tins can be through ZFU or indigenous commercial farmers 
through ICFU). It is open to debate whether this new look DAB should have the MC, a civil 
servant, as the Chairman. The MC's office would provide secretariat services to the DAB. The 
proposed structure is shown in Figure 3, which is in line with inter-sectoral approach to 
managing natural resources.
•  The Ministry should in some instances have its staff relocated to appropriate locations, 
especially to those areas where there is a lot o f mining activity. This will not only cut 
unnecessary travel, but it will also enhance the effectiveness o f monitoring as the officials can 
easily liase with RDCs and local communities. 18*
18 Participation of RDCs and local communities should not, however, be confined to those minerals for which RDCs
get a special grant.
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' Figure 3: Proposed hutitational structure for overseeing mining affairs
d) R evenue sharing
It should be pointed out that the suggestions in Section 5.1 would not result in significant gains for
RDCs and local communities as far as revenue from mining is concerned. To increase the share o f
RDCs and local communities the following should be advocated for:
a Fees that are levied in the mining sector should be reviewed upwards as government is 
subsidising big mining concerns. The Ministry's suggestion that it should charge economic 
rates is a step in the right direction. However, it must not be applied across the board as this 
may disadvantage vulnerable groups.
a Landowners' fees should ideally reflect the opportunity cost o f the land that can no longer be 
cultivated because o f the mining activities. If  this is adopted, RDCs and local communities 
may be adequately compensated.
a Sharing o f income tax, as suggested by the ARDC, may increase the revenue o f RDCs and 
local communities; although it depends on a new law to be enacted
© Consideration should be paid to whether royalties should be levied and if  so who receives 
them and how they will be shared. There is, however, a need to maintain a balance between 
increased revenue and investment in the mining sector. If, as suggested above, landowners' 
fees and unit taxes are raised, there may be no need to charge royalties.
Hiring out equipment to miners by RDCs as well as participating in joint ventures is not
recommended since this is likely to be complex and is liable to be mismanaged As far as possible
RDCs should stick to their core business o f providing services.
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Appendix I
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. Introduction
The Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), under the USAID funded Natural Resource 
Management Project to the Communal Area Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), is 
tasked with the responsibility o f research and analysis o f policy issues that affect the programme. As 
part o f its on-going responsibilities, the Centre wishes to recruit a consultant to undertake a study to 
analyse proposals that are being brought in for changes to the Mines and Minerals Act.
2. Background
The act vests authority to administer granting o f prospecting rights, acquisition o f mining claims, 
payment o f levies to hold claims within the Mines and Minerals Board. The RDCs Act vests authority 
within the RDCs to manage and exploit natural resources within its jurisdiction, except minerals. As 
RDCs begin to consider looking beyond magafauna in CAMPFIRE, one o f the resources they will 
want to control and derive benefits from are minerals.
An interesting case is the granite mining in Mutoko. Private companies are mining granite in Mutoko 
and delivering it to Harare through roads maintained by this RDC. The District does not benefit from 
the levies paid by the private companies to Government to meet maintenance costs for its roads. Also 
RDCs do not have the mandate to control gold panning in their areas and yet the destruction o f the 
biodiversity directly affects them. Gold panning is a livelihood for most landless and unemployed 
rural Zimbabweans, but this exercise is causing massive destruction to the environment. Government is 
now being called upon to revisit this piece o f legislation so as to: 1) ensure that this legislation is in 
harmony with the RDCs Act; and 2) ensure RDCs obtain more benefits from mining activities in the 
District.
The major question is what are the possibilities o f including in CAMPFIRE programmes so that RDCs 
and communities can benefit. Several proposals have been put forward by various interested parties 
and the Ministry o f Mines and Tourism is currently in the process o f consulting stakeholders on the 
way forward.
The study aims to produce a set o f recommendations to CA on actions required to enhance lobbying of 
the proposals, and understanding o f the proposed or actual changes.
3. Outputs:
• Report
a Policy brief
• Seminar
4. To achieve this aim a number o f activities are planned:
• Review the relevant Acts, Bills and existing arrangements
® Review related studies on tenure, community and local governance, community based Natural 
Resources Management and other relevant studies
•  Consult with NGOs, Rural District Councils and Government Departments actively 
participating in the CAMPFIRE Programme to get their views on the bills and acts.
•  ' Highlight both negative and positive impacts o f the bills on CAMPFIRE.
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5. Qualifications o f file consultant
A minimum o f a Masters degree in social sciences, geography, mining or law. The incumbent should 
have more than 5 years working experience in the field o f natural resources management policy 
development and analysis. The incumbent should have superior writing and analytical skills.
6. Reporting
The consultant will report to the Chairman, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, through the 
responsible officer, Ms. B. Sithole. The consultant should consult with Ms B. Sithole during 
preparation o f the proposal and conducting the study.
7. Proposals
Interested candidates should submit proposals on how they intend to undertake the study, estimated 
time per activity, CVs and fees (daily fees at local rates). CASS will meet the cost o f travel to and 
from research sites (3-4 RDCs: a driver and vehicle can be booked at CASS)), field per diems 
($450.00 per day, unproved up to a maximum o f 10 days) and costs for production o f final report. 
$500 will be paid to the consultant on signing o f the contract to meet telephone, faxing, e-mail and 
stationary costs. CASS will also provide a full set o f camping equipment, if  requested.
8. Proposals should be submitted to the Chairman, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, P. O. 
Box MP 167, Mt Pleasant, not later than February 15, 1999.
!
♦
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Appendix II
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MINING SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE
The mining industry has been a major earner o f foreign currency. In 1993 it earned the country Z$3,5 
billion, 4,8 billion in 1997 and 17 billion in 1998. The sector over the years has maintained its 5% 
contribution to GDP [19]. The foreign currency is mainly derived from sale o f metals, minerals and 
mineral related products. Over 40 different metals and minerals are produced in Zimbabwe. The total 
earnings come from mainly large-sector miners. This is because most small-scale producers make use 
o f simple technology thereby limiting production. In addition what they get is usually sold to large 
companies.
Major minerals produced in Zimbabwe include gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, coal and chrome. About 
90% o f Zimbabwe’s mineral production is exported, mostly in a semi-processed form. Major export 
minerals by value are gold, nickel, asbestos, ferrochrome and copper.
M ain institutions
a) M inistry o f Mines, Environment and Tourism (MME1): Oversees mining activities in the 
country.
b) M inerals M arketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe (MMCZ): deals with marketing o f minerals 
except gold and silver.
c) Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe (RBZ): Has exclusive rights to gold and silver purchases
d) Zimbabwe M ining Development Corporation (ZMDCU): Main operations are in gold, copper 
and silver. The corporation runs a research and development laboratory in Harare. This carries out 
lire assays and wet chemical determinations and provides technical assistance and advice to co­
operatives.
e) Institute o f M ining Research (IMR): Financed by an annual grant from MMET supplemented by 
income from research contracts. IMR undertakes research and consultancy work on almost any 
aspect o f mining. IMR works in close liaison with the mining industry in rock mechanics, 
economic geology, applied quo-chemistry, applied mineralogy, mineral processing and mineral 
economics. The main focus has been concentrated in the field o f economic geology and extractive 
metallurgy. Advances in these fields have resulted in considerable economic advantages to the 
mining industry. Contributions have been made to import substitution schemes through the 
Institute’s use o f skills in determinative mineralogy and chemical analysis.
f )  Chamber o f Mines: Represents interests o f big mining concerns
g) Sm all Scale M iners Association o f Zimbabwe (SSM AZ): Represents interests o f small-scale 
miners
Im portance o f the mining sector to the nation
a) Offers both primary and secondary employment:
• Contribution to total formal employment was 3.85% in 1993 compared to 5.16% in 1985 
mainly due to drought (and hence worker retrenchment due to mine closures).
•  Informal sector, represented by illegal gold partners, directly employs an estimated 150,000 
people with an additional 100,000 being indirectly dependent on it.
'’'Business Herald, 3 June 1999
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b) Earns the country foreign currency
•  Over a third o f the country’s foreign currency earnings is derived from mining activities.
c) Source o f revenue:
•  For government from company taxes and personal income taxes and service charges levied by 
the Ministry o f Mines for the services it offers.
d) Contribution to the GDP:
• Averaged slightly over 7% in the period o f 1980 to 1993.
« Lags behind that o f manufacturing and agricultural sectors, which contribute 24% and 10% 
respectively to GDP in 1992.
Costs o f m ining
•  Degradation o f the environment
• Exhaustion o f the minerals
Prospects o f the mining sector
Poor because of:
• high production costs; and
• falling commodity prices.
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Appendix III
PROCEDURES FOR APPLYING MINING CONCESSSIONS IN 
ZIMBABWE
Getting a prospecting licence
For mining administration purposes Zimbabwe is divided into five mining districts. These are Harare, 
Bulawayo, Gweru, Kadoma and Masvingo. A Mining Commissioner (MC) is stationed at each district. 
In addition, there are two sub-districts in Mutare and Gwanda headed by Assistant Mining 
Commissioners (AMCs). Within their respective district the, MCs or AMCs are responsible for issuing 
prospecting licences, registration, transfer, settlement o f pegging disputes, collection o f revenue and 
the maintenance o f records o f mineral production among other things.
A prospecting licence is issued in terms o f the Minerals and Mines Act, Chapter 21.5. Prospecting 
licences are basically issued to two categories o f users/miners. First, they can be issued to individuals. 
Second, they can be issued to a syndicate not exceeding six members, a company or to a partnership. 
It is only people who are over 18 years and resident Zimbabwean citizens who are entitled to obtain a 
prospecting licence. For foreign investors a prospecting licence is only issued when they are in 
partnership with locals. For a syndicate there is need to appoint one person who is regarded an 
accredited agent. The accredited agent must reside in Zimbabwe and must be formally registered 
before any claims are registered in the name o f a company, syndicate or partnership. A prospecting 
licence can either be an ordinary prospecting licence which gives the holder the right to prospect for 
any mineral in Zimbabwe or a special prospecting licence which gives the holder the right to search for 
base minerals only po1. An ordinary prospecting licence attracts a fee o f Z$150 while a special 
prospecting licence costs Z$1 000. Large companies in the mining sector make use o f Exclusive 
Prospecting Orders (EPOs).
The rights conferred by a prospecting licence may only be exercised by an approved prospector. If the 
holder o f the licence is not an approved prospector, there is need to appoint an approved prospector in 
writing as a representative before any pegging is done under the licence. This appointment needs to be 
endorsed on the back o f the licence. The Act defines an approved prospector as a person for the time 
being registered in the Approved Prospectors Register. All approved prospectors are free-lance. They, 
however, need to be trained, tested and registered with the Ministry o f Mines, Environment and 
Tourism. The amount charged by each proven prospector varies depending on how they negotiate 
with their client(s).
The process o f acquiring a prospecting licence is a simple one. One must approach the M ining 
Commissioner’s office in any mining district and complete an application form. This form requires the 
applicant to furnish the MC with his full name, permanent address, date o f birth, nationality and 
indicate whether one is a civil servant or not. For female applicants there is need to state their marital 
status. If  married, they are required to state whether they are married in or out o f community o f 
property. Furthermore, the husband’s address and name is required. Provided the applicant has his/her 
identity card or passport or driver’s licence, and the required fee for the licence, they want they can get 
it in a matter o f minutes.
M' Definitions of a base mineral appear below.
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Entitlements o f a prospecting licence
The right o f prospecting and pegging conferred by the licence is the right to peg/block precious metal, 
precious stone and base mineral claim. Land which is open to prospecting includes state, communal 
and private land in the title to which it has been served either to the British South African Company or 
the Zimbabwean government. Reservations against prospecting and pegging may be by the MC, 
instructed by the Secretary o f Mines on the authority o f the Minister. Reservations are made possible 
by notice posted on the MC’s office o f any area against prospecting or pegging and all rights 
possessed by the holder shall cease.
Certificate o f registration
Having obtained a prospecting licence there is need to acquire a certificate o f registration which allows 
an individual or company to start mining and legally market the produce. Three stages need to be 
followed for one to be given a certificate o f registration. The application for the certificate needs to 
include: (a) a prospecting notice; (b) a discovery notice; and (c) a registration notice. The above forms 
need to be attached to a claims plan.
Before any prospecting is done there is need to give a notice o f this intention. This can be done in 
various ways. For instance, if  a portion o f townland is to be used, there is need to give notice in 
writing by registered letter addressed to the local authority. This applies to private land also. For 
communal land there is need to give notice to the district council. Failure to comply with the above 
renders the outcome of the pegged mines invalid. The prospecting notice is followed by a discovery 
notice. This is marked by a peg “DP”. The notice shows that a particular mineral has been discovered 
in that area. According to the Act a registration notice is issued within 31 days o f 24 hours from 
posting o f the prospecting notice. The holder o f the licence, who has discovered within the area 
covered by such notice any one mineral or deposit, may peg a block. Within the same period the 
holder of any mining location upon which a registration notice has been posted may, on application to 
the MC within a period o f 31 days after date o f posting such notice and on payment o f the prescribed 
fee, obtain a certificate o f registration.
With the certificate o f registration, one can start drilling or extracting on the ground open to 
prospecting. The above mentioned three notices need to be attached to a claims plan to avoid 
instances o f overpegging. It is the responsibility o f an approved prospect to demarcate mine claims. 
A claim is equivalent to one hectare. For precious metals one can be allocated a maximum o f 10 ha 
and for base minerals a maximum o f 25 ha.
Details on a certificate or registration include a registration number for precious metals (it is written in 
blue while for base minerals it is written in red). The name o f the mine is usually issue by the Ministry 
based on location o f the mine. The certificate gives also the number o f a holder's claim(s). The 
information on the certificate supplies Ministry officials with information, which enable them to 
embark on field trips for inspection purposes. It also helps in solving disputes between those in the 
mining sector and surrounding fanners. The certificate is o f paramount importance if  the individual is 
to access the market when selling mineral resources.
There are a number o f circumstances under which a prospecting licence can be cancelled. Overpegging 
o f claims results in cancellation. It is common in areas where owners o f such claims have gone for a 
long time without developing their sites. A prospecting licence can be cancelled when improperly 
allocated claims are developed. For instance, Boka Investment Pvt. (Ltd.) claims o f base mineral 
scheelite were cancelled due to improper pegging pll  A duplicate prospecting licence can be issued by 
any MC upon forwarding a letter stating the loss o f a licence, its licence number and from which MC’s 
office it was originally issued.
21 Business Herald, 3 September 1989.
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Exclusive Prospecting Orders deny holders o f prospecting licences authority to start mining without 
conditionalities. Those who mine in such areas need to apply to the holder (o f E.P.O.) and in most 
cases they are forced to sell their produce through the holder o f die Exclusive Prospecting order.
One main problem highlighted by Mining Commissioner officials is the need to educate those 
members o f the public holding prospecting licences i.e. that the licence does not mean ownership o f a 
mine but only gives them the right to mine mineral resources in these areas.
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Appendix IV
MARKETING OF MINERALS IN ZIMBABWE
The marketing o f minerals in Zimbabwe is governed by three acts o f parliament, namely die Base 
Minerals Export Control Act o f 1949, the Gold Trade Act and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of 
Zimbabwe (MMCZ) Act o f 1982. The last Act resulted in the formation o f a public enterprise, Mineral 
Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe, which began to function in March 1983. MMCZ is concerned 
only with the export o f minerals. Prior to independence a Chamber o f Mines official indicated that 
mining companies used to deal directly with their customers abroad. However, gold and silver were 
sold to the Central Bank. Under sanctions the government after UDI supported the formation o f a 
private company Universal Export (Unvex) to promote the export o f minerals.
In order to understand how the marketing o f minerals is done in Zimbabwe there is need to highlight 
the provisions o f the Act on this subject. Furthermore, there is need to explain the functions, 
structures, power and mandate o f MMCZ.
Gold and silver
The Base Mineral Export Control Act defines a base mineral to mean coal, coke and all such slimes 
(concentrates, slags, trailing and residues). Excluded under base mineral definition are precious metals, 
stones, mineral oils and natural gas. Precious stones include beryls, diamonds, emeralds, rabies and 
any other substance that the President declares to be a precious stone. According to this Act the 
Minister o f Mines has the right to prohibit export o f all base minerals. The Minister can direct that all 
base minerals or any specified base mineral may only be exported from Zimbabwe. An order may 
prescribe the quantity o f the base minerals that may be exported, the period and the place from 
consumers o f the base mineral. Failure to compile with the demands o f this law attracts a penalty fine 
not exceeding Z$1 000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or both.
The trade in gold is governed by the Gold Trade Act. According to this Act holders o f gold dealing 
licences should deliver gold to the Reserve Bank not later than the 10th o f every month. Under this 
Act three types o f licences exist:
(a) Gold Dealing Licence - allows the holder to buy, sell, barter or exchange gold;
(b) Gold Recovery Works Licence - entitles the holder to buy and receive gold which is not in the 
form o f alluvial or amalgam; and
(c) Gold Assaying Licence - allows the holder to receive gold for purposes o f analysis or testing and 
to sell any gold resulting from such operations only to a holder o f a gold dealing licence.
The Secretary o f Mines, or any person authorised by him, issues the above licences. There is need to 
receive written authority o f the Minister o f Finance in issuing these licences. They are valid for a year 
and a licence fee has to be paid for issue or renewal o f a licence. The Minister may fix such a fee by 
notice in a statutory instrument. Gold that has been confiscated becomes state property in possession 
o f the Ministry o f Mines.
All bullion produced in Zimbabwe is processed by Fidelity Printers and Refineries (Pvt) Ltd, a 
company wholly owned by the Reserve Bank. The refinery has a capacity o f 50 tonnes o f gold per 
year, refined to a purity o f 99.5%. Silver for domestic use and export is also processed at the refinery. 
The refinery only processes approximately 19 tonnes meaning its operating far below its capacity[221.
” Chamber of Mines, 1994 prospectus.
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Fidelity Printers is not prepared to purchase amounts o f gold less than fifty grammes. A study funded 
by government and United Nations Development Fund (UNDF)t23J recommended that partners could 
be issued with permits from local authorities so that they can sell gold to the appointed agents.
Other minerals
Having discussed how gold and silver are marketed effort is now directed at how the other minerals 
are marketed. To do this there is need to give information pertaining to the functions, powers, duties, 
financial provision and conditions o f sale and export o f minerals by MMCZ. MMCZ was established 
by a 1982 Act o f Parliament. It is controlled by a body known as the Minerals Marketing Board 
(MMB). The body is headed by a chairman appointed by the Minister, the general manager o f MMCZ 
and seven other members appointed by the Minister.
According to the Act, MMCZ is the sole marketing and selling agent for all minerals except gold and 
silver. It is empowered to investigate or cause to investigate conditions, whether inside or outside 
Zimbabwe, for sale o f minerals in general or any particular mineral. MMCZ is responsible for the 
purchase and acquisition o f any mineral for its own account and sell or dispose such minerals. It also 
must encourage the local beneficiation and utilisation o f any mineral and advise the Minister on all 
matters connected with marketing o f minerals. The company has 5 sales divisions which are: (1) metal 
division - ferroalloys, nickel and copper by-products; (2) asbestos; (3) steel and granite; (4) gemores, 
graphite, emeralds, lithium ores and diamonds; and (5) new products - coke, coal and platinum group 
metals.
When performing its duties, the Corporation at all times acts in such a manner as to promote the 
efficient marketing, export and sale o f minerals. This is done, taking into account the national interest 
o f Zimbabwe, the interest o f any producer and in order to keep expenses as low as is consistent with 
the provisions o f efficient services to producers and sellers o f minerals. The Corporation must be self- 
sufficient. Money not directly required by die Corporation may be invested in such a manner as the 
Minister acting on advice o f the Minister o f finance may approves.
The control o f sale and export o f minerals is governed by a particular section o f the MMCZ Act. 
Under this section no person other than the corporation shall sell any mineral outside Zimbabwe 
except to the corporation or in terms o f a contract negotiated by the corporation on behalf o f the seller 
or when authorised to do so by the corporation. Any person who sells or exports any minerals in 
contravention o f provisions o f the Act shall be guilty o f an offence and liable to: a) a fine not 
exceeding $2,000; b) imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years; or c) both fine and 
imprisonment.
Any person who wishes to sell any mineral either in or out o f Zimbabwe needs to provide the 
Corporation with particulars o f its type, quantity, grade and location; including details o f proposal if  
any for the sale or export o f the mineral. The Corporation has the right to negotiate on behalf o f the 
seller the sale o f the mineral concerned. The Corporation can purchase the mineral concerned from the 
seller on such terms and conditions as may be agreed between it and the seller. MMCZ can grant the 
authority to sell or even export the mineral concerned, subject to such terms and conditions as the 
Corporation may impose. The MMCZ by notice in writing served upon the person concerned can fix 
the maximum quantity o f any mineral that any person may own, or have in their possession. The 
authority to sell or export is valid for a period not exceeding 12 months.
With the above information, it is evident that MMCZ has a monopoly in the marketing o f Zimbabwe 
minerals. MMCZ operates by charging a commission o f 0.875% o f the gross value o f the mineral. 
This is considered a small charge considering that private agents might charge between 3-4%. In 1996 
the Corporation collected Z$46m in commissions from sale o f minerals, the bulk o f which comprised
B^usiness Herald 1998
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ferroalloys (nickel and asbestos). It made a profit o f 18 million dollars and paid a dividend o f 8 
million dollars to the state1241.
The Deputy Divisional Manager o f the metal division at MMCZ stated that the corporation does not 
trade in minerals but acts as a middleman. The corporation, therefore, usually functions either by 
purchasing goods for resale or by acting as an agent on behalf o f the producer. In both cases, MMCZ 
arranges transport and insurance o f goods.
Two major companies have been exempted from exporting their minerals through MMCZ. These are 
Hartley Platinum mine in Norton (a joint venture between Australia Delta Gold and BHP Minerals) 
and Africa Resources Limited, producers o f asbestos at Shabani Mine in Zvishavane and Gaths Mine 
in Mashava. These mines negotiate and agree on prices on their own with their customers and advise 
MMCZ on the terms o f reference with the market. Before they can export anything they have to seek 
approval from MMCZ.
The view o f members o f Chamber o f Mines is that MMCZ is an unnecessary establishment for file 
mining giants. They argue there is need to change the marketing strategy with large companies having 
to deal directly with their customers without having to go through MMCZ. The MMCZ must remain 
responsible to monitor prices and or assist small scale miners who might not have the capacity to 
produce and export directly to their outside customers. The Minerals Marketing Board o f MMCZ has 
had commercialisation proposals but this has been turned down by the Ministry according to MMCZ 
officials.
24 Financial Gazette, 16 January 1997.
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Appendix V
BREAKDOWN OF MINING REVENUE BETWEEN CENTRAL AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
This appendix is based on a study, Mining Revenue - Who Gels What?, commissioned by the 
Association o f Rural District Councils and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The report covered an 
analysis o f mineral revenues in the national economy and analysis o f mineral revenue for two rural 
district councils (RDC) - Bubi and Mberengwa. The report cautioned that since Bubi district had 654 
mines and Mberengwa 290, and many o f these mines had their head-offices outside the districts, a 
district financial survey would be a large, difficult and complex undertaking. To this end the report 
claimed that estimates could not be considered exact as they were o f the correct order o f magnitude.
Purpose and objectives o f the shady
The study was concerned with obtaining data on the comparative distribution o f benefits from the 
mining sector such as taxes, levies and incomes between central government and local authority, the 
RDCs. It was observed that this comparison needed to be interpreted with reference to the stated 
government policy that RDCs should become financially independent and that the RDCs should 
mostly be responsible for financing development o f this district. The study had these specific 
objectives:
® To illustrate the role played by minerals and mining in the national economy in terms of the 
contribution to GDP, employment creation, foreign currency earnings and to support 
industries
• To quantify revenue that accrues from mining and minerals sector in the form of company tax, 
income tax levied on employees, levies, licence and service feeds that accrue to die Ministry 
o f Mines from the lease o f mining properties and claims
• To quantity the income accrues to RDCs in each district from mining activities
•  To consider the relative distribution o f tax incomes from mining and to compare the share 
accruing to the RDCs and the state.
Research Methodology
The project was executed at two levels:
a) Micro economic analysis
This was basically'desk research, which relied on published data, hi cases where it was judged as 
being inadequate visits to relevant ministries, government departments and company offices were 
undertaken.
b) District based research work
This involved visits to mining district offices in Masvingo and Bulawayo within which the two 
RDCs under study were located. Visits were made to the RDC offices and a selection o f mines in 
each district. The purpose o f the survey visits was to document any sources o f revenue data that 
the RDC maintained and collect data from the mines on production employment, company taxes 
paid, personal tax paid and any levies or tax paid directly to the RDC.
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Public data was obtained from or through Central Statistical Office (CSO), Ministry o f Mines (head 
office) Mining District Offices, Institute o f Mining Research Database and company annul reports. 
Two sets o f questionnaires were designed, namely district council and mines questionnaire.
Direct government revenue from raining
Minerals generate income for the state in three main ways, revenue from registration and services, 
revenue from mining, corporate and personal taxes and employee tax.
a) Revenue from  registration and services
The central government, through the Ministry o f Mines, receives revenue from mining companies 
and individuals engaged in mining in the form o f prospecting licences, inspections, registration 
fees, rents, duplicating certificates and other fees such as blasting licences. The amount received 
by the Ministry has been increasing each year as collection methods improve and fees are 
increased. The amount o f service charges received rose from Z$464 900 in 1989 to Z$3 475 800 
in 1993, an increase o f 640% in the five year period.
b) Revenuefrom  mining, corporate and personal taxes
Government derives the greatest share o f its tax revenues through corporate taxes and personal 
income taxes. Data published by CSO shows that the mining sector makes variable contribution to 
total government tax revenues.
c) Employee tax
Government receives revenue in the form o f PAYE from employees o f mining companies.
d) Conclusion
It can be concluded that there is enough evidence to show that mining is an important sector in the 
Zimbabwe economy. It accounts for an average 7,21% o f GDP, export earnings (31,9%) 
employment (3.85%), gross fixed capital formation and government revenue through company 
taxes (5.41%) and personal taxes (4.785).
Minerals revenue analysis for two pilot districts
The macro-economic analysis indicates the importance o f mining to the whole country but it is unable 
to clarify the effect o f mining at local level. It is at district level that the minerals are mined, the 
environment damaged, employment generated and district revenues collected. The district-based study 
o f Mberengwa and Bubi aimed to quantify the revenue that mining contributes to each RDC.
a) Mberengwa
The district has 289 registered mines producing a wide range o f minerals such as gold, emeralds, 
diamonds and base metals. Since mining districts differ from administrative districts revenue 
information is not directly relevant to the administrative district o f origin.
Data was obtained for the first 5 months o f 1995 and used in the analysis to indicate the revenue 
levels. The total o f Z$129 294 collected from Mberengwa was retained by the Ministry o f Mines 
and represented 60% o f revenue collected for the whole o f Masvingo mining district. This money 
was collected on behalf o f the Ministry and does not accrue to the RDCs at all. It may be 
considered as revenue that accrues directly to the central state.
The revenue collected bvMberenewa RDC comes from sold pannine
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Until September 1991, RDCs were not empowered to collect revenue from panning as the activity 
was illegal. Mberengwa RDC started collecting revenue from gold panners in 1993. There are 
four rivers (Bin, Shande, Mondi and Mwenezi) along which massive panning is currently taking 
place. For the fiscal year 1992 -  1994, the council collected Z$11 000 from panning registration 
fees for 550 panning licences. During the period July 1994 to April 1995 it collected only Z$21 
900 through issues o f 145 panning licences.
According to the Rural District Councils Act No. 8, 1999 (Section 96), RDCs are entitled to 
collect a unit tax from all mining operations. Previously RDCs were not entitled to this tax. For 
unit tax collection purpose, a unit is defined differently for precious metals (gold and gemstones) 
and base metals. Precious minerals units are defined in terms o f people employed while base 
metals units are defined in terms o f the number o f saleable output. According to the regulations 
each council fixes its own fee per unit. Mberengwa has set the fee at Z$850 per unit. Using the 
definition o f a unit (Appendix 6) there were 182 units which the council could have charged for 
and generated revenue to the tune o f Z$154 700, at the current charge. In 1993 the various base 
metals produced resulted in 329 chargeable units for the district. Using the current Z$850 per unit 
the council could have raised venue o f Z$279 743.50 per year. The total revenue amounted to 
Z$430 000 for the year 1993. However, the RDC did not collect unit tax in 1993.
Mberengwa RDC has proposed to levy unit tax in the 1995/96 fiscal year. However, revenues 
from unit taxes are still an extremely small proportion o f the total value o f the minerals mined out 
from the district.
b) Bubi
Not much data could be extracted from the MC's office in Bulawayo under which Bubi district 
falls because o f the pathetic state o f records. There are very few registered mines in Bubi because 
large tracts o f land are taken up by numerous EPOs in the area From available records at 
Bulawayo mining district office the Ministry collected little revenue. In 1994 the Ministry 
collected only Z$15 530 from mine inspections, Z$1 900 from the issue o f prospecting licences 
and $1 800 in 1995.
The council started collecting revenue from mining companies in 1990 in the form o f the Land 
Development Levy or unit tax. However, the council does not have a full list o f the mining 
companies operating in the district. The Bubi RDC raised its unit tax from Z$100 in 1990 to 
Z$250 in 1995. The council collected $20 066.25 as unit tax between 1991 and 1995, an average 
o f Z$4000 per year.
Using the definition o f a unit given in the RDC Act, the council could have charged for 66 units in 
1993. Using their charge o f Z$154 per unit in 1993 the total unit tax was Z$10 164. However the 
council only collected Z$8 540.72 for 2 financial years. This indicates inefficiency in the current 
system of revenue collection.
Despite the legalisation o f gold panning the council has not registered any claim. The argument 
they have is that it does not have enough manpower to monitor the activities o f the panners and to 
enforce laws related to panning. Council also feels registration might encourage more people to 
go into panning thus further devastating the environment.
Conclusions
The report presents a comparison o f revenue that accrued to the central treasury and value o f revenues
from the two pilot districts (see table below).
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M ineral Derived Income Com parison - C entral Governm ent vs. RDC
D istrict State Income RDC Income
Mberengwa Z$25 million Z$11,000 (0.0004%)
Bubi Z$12 million Z$5,000 (0.0004%)
From the above it is obvious that RDCs are receiving a highly inequitable share o f their mineral wealth 
as shown by the fact that:
« RDCs receive less than 0.001% of the tax revenue generated by the minerals industry in their 
districts
•  Central Treasury received on average MZS6.6 per RDC from derived taxes (1993/95).
•  District natural resources are permanently depleted by mining and the brunt o f the 
environmental damage is borne at district level
•  Employment opportunities are generated preferentially for local populations.
Since the permanent loss o f mineral resources, the environmental degradation associated with mining 
and the use and depreciation o f established infrastructure is at the expense o f locals and their RDCs, it 
would appear that there is a strong case for re-examining the split o f the tax income between the RDC 
and the state. The revenue data is insufficiently comprehensive for clear, indisputable financial analysis 
o f the disbursement o f district mineral taxes between the RDCs and the Central Government.
Recommendations
a) Distribution o f tax income
The report did not claim to present a comprehensive view o f all possible opinions o f all possible 
stakeholders. However, it suggested that RDCs share o f levy/tax from mining was unacceptably 
low and was a major impediment to the more rapid development o f district economics. It was 
noted that if  30% o f tax income from mining was devolved to die RDCs this would not prejudice 
the state unduly since the tax income to the state from this sector is 5% o f its total tax income.
The ARDs will need to mount serious high level political campaign in order to get parliament to 
consider and debate the issue o f the distribution o f mineral revenue. ARDs are recommended to 
formulate a detailed district mineral policy regarding distribution o f tax income, mobilise and 
campaign for public support for such policy both in parliament and at district level.
b) Other recommendations
All mines must register with their local RDC including those with EPO and claims. The Ministry 
o f Mines must provide information pertaining to annual production, value o f sales, national taxes 
and local levies paid to RDC. The district minerals databases can form the basis o f a system for 
RDCs to ensure that all mining activities in the district are registered and that due levies are 
collected.
RDCs can expand their revenue base by introducing levies on all pegged claims and EPOs. This 
will discourage claim holders from holding dormant claims to the detriment o f RDC development.
The RDC Act on mining unit tax and development is inequitable since revenue collection is not
based on mine profits. A tax or profits is much more likely to provide an equitable distribution.
RDCs should be legalised to buy gold in small quantities o f even less than 20 grammes thus
reducing the losses from illegal gold being taken out o f the country and district while providing
revenue for the RDC. Such measures appear to be highly successful in Tanzania
c) Support to local m ining activities
a The Geological Survey and Ministry o f Mines provide much needed support to small scale 
miners but, due to under-funding they have not been able to provide this service. This has led 
to bad investments and environmental damage.
a RDCs can assist by the helping to co-ordinate and improve the dissemination o f geological, 
technical and management and advice to small-scale miners.
a EPOs appear to be in the interest o f large mining companies. RDCs can campaign for changes 
to the mining laws so those claims are pegged for specific minerals and are not exclusive.
® Most mine operators would welcome a closer relationship with the RDC in order to lobby for 
better infrastructure and assist with dispute settlement especially between landowners and 
miners
» Environmental degradation due to mining and gold panning is common but there is no 
recompense to the host district. Environmental damage take the form of siltation of 
dams/rivers deforestation, open trenches, mine shafts, mercury and cyanide pollution o f water 
and ground water supplies
a There is a general shortage o f equipment among small-scale mines and RDCs can assist by 
providing and selling such services. Ventures such as operations o f milling plants, the hiring 
o f transport and provision o f blasting services among others will enhance the small-scale 
miners while generating revenue for the RDCs
•  RDCs can get involved in joint ventures with local miners particularly in sourcing finance for 
mining development
o District mineral resources can fit into the CAMPFIRE framework and the ARDs should 
explore ways o f co-operating with CAMPFIRE which has both skills in the development of 
local rural enterprises and also has the experience for a reassessment o f die way in which the 
revenue derived from the district mineral resources are distributed
© The central state often pays for major access roads and power supplies to be brought to distant 
mining communities. This factor needs to be considered in negotiations over district mineral 
revenue.
43
Appendix VI
LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED
Association o f Rural District Councils
CAMPFIRE Association
Chambers o f Mines
Mudzi Rural District Council
Mutoko Rural District Council
Guruve Rural District Council
Minerals Marketing Corporation o f Zimbabwe
Mining Commissioner's office (Harare District)
Ministry o f Local Government 
National Miners Association o f Zimbabwe 
Ministry o f Lands and Agriculture
Zimbabwe Trust
Centre for Applied Social Sciences 
University of Zimbabwe
POBoxMP 167 
Mount Pleasant, Harare 
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